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UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 25 AND AUGUST 28, 1980

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[1] Elected to committee July 2, 1980.

PREFACE

The following hearings were held to place on public record the concerns of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs regarding the course of Korean-American relations since the assassination of President Park in October 1979, through the declaration of martial law, and the arrest and trial of many political, religious, and intellectual leaders.

Key questions discussed in both hearings included the facts underlying the various events themselves, both as they related to the domestic Korean context and as they might impact on Korean-American relations.

Particular emphasis was placed on the nature and extent of the U.S. response to the various events, both public and private. The case of former Presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung was discussed, and both the subcommittee and the executive branch witnesses made clear the mutual concerns held by the U.S. Government and people regarding the arrest and trial of so many popular South Korean leaders.

Both the subcommittee and executive branch sought to emphasize that two concerns were paramount: First, a general humanitarian hope that compassion would be forthcoming for the various defendants; second, that the interests of internal stability would be served in a manner which would not weaken the ability of the Korean people to withstand external threats.

It has been a consistent theme of this subcommittee that human rights and U.S. strategic concerns legitimately intersect when domestic stability comes into question. As the following hearings demonstrate, the executive branch also shares this view.

Where judgments differ is in the selection of appropriate measures for the United States to demonstrate its legitimate concerns over the actions of another government. This is a serious debate, one which was not solved in these hearings, but which will be continued in the next Congress, no doubt, as it was begun in previous Congresses.

For its part, in addition to hearings such as these, the subcommittee has communicated both in writing, and in personal, private meetings, its concerns regarding the future of United States-Korean relations, and the more general concerns discussed above.

It is hoped that publication of these hearings will help focus the attention of the Congress and the American people on vital issues involved in United States-Korean relations, and will set the stage for continued examination of these relations in the coming months.

LESTER L. WOLFF,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

CONTENTS

Page

Preface III

WITNESSES

Wednesday, June 25, 1980:
Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State 3
Thursday, August 28, 1980:
Hon. Don Bonker, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington 25
Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State 27

APPENDIXES

1. Questions to State Department by subcommittee members on the current economic, domestic, political, and international situation with regards to South Korea and State Department's answers to those questions 51
2. Statement of J. Bryan Hehir, United States Catholic Conference, entitled "U.S. Policy in Korea: Security and Human Rights" 54

UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9:40 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLFF. The subcommittee will come to order. It is highly significant that this particular hearing is being held on the 30th anniversary of the launching of the North Korean attack upon South Korea. If anything, this should be a signal to the North Koreans that despite the turmoil that exists in South Korea's political base, they should not misinterpret any of the concerns that we have, as they misinterpreted 30 years ago the U.S. position, of a close alliance with the people of South Korea.

The events of the past month in South Korea have caused serious concern for us, of course, but particularly for the people of South Korea. Just a few months ago, during a visit by the subcommittee, we heard cautious optimism expressed on all sides that the students and the military would cooperate, that democracy would take hold, and that the domestic uncertainty which had adversely affected all aspects of Korean life could be addressed by a people confident of their future.

Today, these hopes—dreams—would appear to lie in tatters, and many of the prominent political and social leaders with whom we met last January are in jail or have dropped out of sight.

The U.S. Government has reacted to this ongoing crisis in a variety of ways, and an examination of United States-South Korean relations in the wake of events on either side of the Pacific is the topic of our hearing today.

Our witness, Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, is particularly well suited to help us in today's task, as he spent nearly 3 years as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and as a member of the National Security Council staff, specializing in defense and strategic questions for North Asia.

SUBCOMMITTEE CONCERNS

From the outset, we in the Congress, as with the administration, I am sure, have been faced with potential conflict between reacting to Korean domestic events and the strategic need to make sure that the continued U.S. commitment to the external security of South Korea remain constant and devoid of doubt.

I think that we have generally succeeded in this vital task.

However, one of the major themes I have been trying to articulate for the past several years, be it South Korea or in the Philippines or in Taiwan, is that external security is directly and inherently related to internal stability. No amount of tanks or missiles, and no U.S. nuclear umbrella, can shield a government from its own people.

That is why, in my initial floor remarks on the Korean situation on May 20, I stressed the point that the U.S. position must continue to be that the best interests of the Korean people and the United States will be served by a return to progress toward restoring the democratic process. This statement and the followup statement I made on May 22 are available today for your reference.

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

Among the questions which we will address today, in public session, will be some of the specific responses of the U.S. Government to the situation in South Korea, and what, if any, has been the South Korean reaction.

I understand that the U.S. Embassy has recently taken the extraordinary step of distributing several thousand copies of summaries of statements by President Carter, Secretary Muskie, and others directly to U.S. businessmen and Korean citizens, because of a lack of information in South Korea on the U.S. position.

Second, we will be interested in the administration's view on why there has been little, if any, reaction from North Korea over a period extending well before the assassination of President Park in October. Do we have here one of the benefits of United States-China relations?

Third, we will want to examine closely some of the specific military questions raised by the recent events, including the role of the Allied Supreme Commander, General Wickham, both before, during, and after the riots in Seoul and Kwangju. Obviously, events have called into question the integrity of the joint command structure, and we will want to satisfy ourselves that this structure is still intact.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, for the immediate short run, we will be seeking to emphasize our individual concern over the well-being of Kim Daejung, Kim Jong-pil, and many of the prominent men and women with whom we met in January, who are now somewhere in custody.

As a parenthetical comment, I would note that frequently in the past few months I have seen it said that our Embassy lacks broadly based contacts at all levels of Korean society. Whether or not this is true, I find it disturbing that many of our questions over the months have received the answer, "We don't have those sources of information." If ever there should be a nation where the United States and the people at all levels of another society, public and private, know each other well, it should be South Korea. I am not talking about spying on one another. I am talking about mutual interaction and mutual trust based on 30 years of friendship and interdependence.

It is our hope that this situation can be rebuilt, and that the traditional admiration and respect of the Korean and American people for each other will win out over the present atmosphere of fear and mistrust.

A return to the democratic process in South Korea would hasten this day, a day, I feel we all agree, that will be in the best interests of stability in Asia.

I am going to yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Guyer, for any opening statement.

Mr. GUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

I think this meeting is most timely. This question has been in the minds and hearts of many people over many months. We have a real concern for the direction in which South Korea is going. I am more concerned this morning to hear some of the answers to these queries than to make comment. I will defer any further comment, and I thank the chairman for the opportunity.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you.

Any other members who would like to make a comment at this point?

Mr. GOODLING. No.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. The only thing, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Armacost could, I would ask possibly after his opening statement, after a few questions, to address the Thailand situation, very briefly.

Mr. WOLFF. Very well.

Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. No statement, thank you. I just came to listen.

Mr. WOLFF. I can't believe that. [Laughter.]

Mr. ARMACOST. That makes me worried.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Armacost, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ARMACOST, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA

Mr. ARMACOST. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the sentiments expressed in your statement, with which I am largely in agreement. It strikes me as a highly appropriate time to raise these questions. I will be most happy to address them.

I likewise welcome this opportunity to meet with your committee and discuss the effect of recent events in the Republic of Korea on our relations with that country. Let me make a few opening remarks and then seek to address some of the questions that you have raised. I will be happy to comment on any further questions you have.

SECURITY IS PRIME OBJECTIVE

The first point that warrants emphasis is one to which you likewise alluded. It is important to remember the context in which we view developments in Korea are dominated by the objective of insuring continued peace and stability on the peninsula. The nature of the local military balance and the persistent risk of renewed conflict in Korea have required a continued U.S. troop presence, a buildup in recent years of South Korean military capabilities, and the development of an integrated command structure. It is our judgment that failure to maintain these elements of deterrence could heighten the dangers of hostilities, involving not only the two Koreas, but also China and the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States with unpredictable but profound consequences for the whole East Asian power balance.

My second observation would be that it is important to recall that the existence of this threat and its persistence over a period of a

66-498 O - 80 - 2

generation has produced in South Korea a considerable emphasis on maintaining stability through a fairly centralized political system. Given our own commitment to democratic values and especially our belief that over the long term, political stability requires the active consent of those who are governed, our relationship with the Republic of Korea during a period in which that centralization is pronounced has at times been troubled, despite the existence of very strong, shared security interests.

The assassination of President Park last October marked an important watershed in Korean politics. The previous era was one in which there had been great economic success, great social strides, and considerable equity in the distribution of increased wealth. Yet the very success of Korea in mounting economic growth rates of 10 to 15 percent a year produced a number of new leadership elements. It produced a very complicated economic system. It produced an educated population and thereby contributed to pressures for greater popular involvement in government and stronger safeguards for the expression of dissenting views.

IMPORTANCE OF CIVILIAN RULE

As he returned from the funeral of President Park last November Secretary Vance stated that there was hope that the interim government would be able to manage an orderly and constitutional transition under civilian rule in a manner which would be broadly supported by the Korean people.

Subsequently the interim government announced, and we heartily endorsed, a program by President Choi in December for constitutional change and elections which we anticipated would lead to a new popular elected government by the spring of 1981. There were understandable differences among Koreans about the pace, the mechanism, the personalities, and leaders within Korea that would emerge in that process. But those were not particularly appropriate subjects for us to comment on.

Rather, our concern was with forward movement toward constitutional reform and elections and the emergence of a goverment which was broadly supported and accepted.

As this delicate transition process unfolded—the dismantling of authoritarian controls, the attempts to draw a variety of elements back into the political mainstream, the efforts of the parties to select their leaders and to rebuild their organizations, and the initiation of a process of constitutional reform—it was clear, I think, that the road would not be an easy one; there would be obstacles along the way.

OBSTACLES

We recognized from the outset two obstacles to the orderly development of an elected and broadly based civilian government within. I might add, a society which historically has had its share of factionalism and which, in all candor, is not best known for political conciliation or political compromise. On the one hand, the students and certain opposition groups were demanding rapid, wholesale change, and we feared their impatience might create a degree of disorder which would exceed the tolerance of other elements in the establishment and raise fears about external intervention. On the other hand,

we feared elements within the military, impatient with the inefficiencies of interim government or the disorderliness in general of democratic politics, might take matters in their own hands and seek to establish order and discipline in ways that society might not find acceptable. Both dangers, to some extent, were recognized.

ROK ARMY

Beginning on December 12, a group within the army took progressive steps culminating in the extension of martial law to the entire country and a political crackdown to increase their own control of the country. I will be glad to go into those matters in greater detail if you wish. For the present, let me say simply that, contrary to the impressions that the authorities in Seoul may have occasionally attempted to convey, the United States neither knew in advance nor conveyed its approval regarding any of these actions.

On the contrary, we regarded those events, most notably those in mid-May, as a setback to the evolution of a broadly based government that we hoped to see emerge in Korea. Both publicly and privately, we have expressed our deep concern about the actions taken by the martial law authorities. We have expressed our fears that they would exacerbate rather than alleviate the nation's problems.

U.S. POSITION CENSORED

The Korean public may not fully comprehend our position due to rather stringent censorship, but we have been concerned consistently about several things. One, that North Korea might seek to take advantage of the situation and exploit it for its own aims. To that end we have, as you did yourself, Mr. Chairman, reminded everyone of our commitment to the Republic of Korea, warned outside elements not to meddle, and, on occasion, when the situation in our judgment demanded, brought forces into the area as a tangible expression of our concern.

We have also been concerned about the importance of moderation and restraint among elements involved in the political process inside the Republic of Korea.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that our deep economic and security concerns in Korea have not changed. I would underscore the continuing U.S. treaty commitment to the Republic of Korea. As I have just said, we have occasionally warned against any effort by outsiders to intervene.

Recently developments have complicated the pursuit of our interests. Long-term stability in the Republic of Korea, in our view, will require political accommodations among significant social and political groups. Those accommodations have not yet been struck. Our own policies inevitably will be affected by the nature and extent of such accommodations.

The processes through which they are accomplished are naturally up to the Korean people, for they, rather than the U.S. Government, must ultimately be the arbiters of the balance struck between the need on the one hand for effective governmental authority and, on the other, for means through which the public, various elements of the public,

may express their views and, in return, see some responsiveness on the part of the authorities.

Our relationship with the Korean Government cannot be unaffected by these events or that process though we will continue to work together on matters of mutual importance.

KEY U.S. CONCERNS

There are several key concerns at the moment. You alluded to one; that is, the arrest of political leaders, including such prominent individuals as Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil. We have been concerned by the suspension of the National Assembly and by the deepening military involvement of Korean generals in day-to-day political affairs.

At the height of the disturbance in Kwangju, we publicly expressed the hope that when that situation had calmed, the Government would quickly resume a program of political development. Recently President Choi did announce that a new constitution would be submitted to public referendum before the end of October, and that elections would be held in the spring of 1981 in order to permit a new government to be installed by the end of June. These are important goals, but their realization on terms that contribute to the long-term stability of South Korea is likely to be more difficult than was earlier envisioned.

We believe actions will speak louder than words in the coming months, and we naturally adjust our relations accordingly.

Those constitute, Mr. Chairman, the opening observations I intended to make. I have not addressed several of the questions that you have raised. I am prepared to do that, if you think that is appropriate, or I can respond to questions.

SPY SHIP INCIDENT

Mr. WOLFF. Why don't you respond to the questions I raised and then I will yield my time to others on the committee. I would like you to address one other point, however, and that is the authenticity or the implications of the spy ship incident that just recently occurred.

Mr. ARMACOST. We have no reason to question that that was an authentic incident involving efforts to infiltrate North Korean agents into the south. The vessel was sunk, as you know. Active efforts are underway to raise the vessel, and that, I presume, will provide more concrete evidence.

Mr. WOLFF. There was more to that than just one ship. I understood that the North Koreans put up sophisticated aircraft as well.

Mr. ARMACOST. In the course of the ROK's pursuit of that vessel, the North Koreans did put up aircraft. They did not penetrate south of the midline extension over the sea. South Korean aircraft also went up. No U.S. aircraft were involved. The North Korean airplanes returned to their bases. I have no reason to doubt the authenticity of this incident. Perhaps there will be more evidence, once the ship itself is raised.

You asked, Mr. Chairman, first about North Korean restraint. I have several comments on that.

Their restraint has to be measured against what one expects of them. There have not been efforts by the North to undertake major

military action. Provocative actions of that sort have not occurred during the past 8 or 10 months. Obviously, we welcome that kind of restraint.

In other respects, I think North Korean behavior has been less restrained. They have engaged in quite vitriolic propaganda attacks against the South and they have renewed their calls for popular revolution in the South. They have mounted an active diplomatic effort in the nonalined movement seeking to resume discussion of Korean issues in international fora.

VISITS TO NORTH KOREA

Mr. WOLFF. May I say on this diplomatic effort, a number of Members have been invited to North Korea by the North Koreans. How does the Department view that?

Mr. ARMACOST. The travel of Members of this body obviously is up to the Members of this body.

Mr. WOLFF. I am not asking you for permission, because we will not ask you for permission.

How will this affect relations? How will it be perceived?

Mr. ARMACOST. I would make two comments, Mr. Chairman.

First, I think it is important to note that we are not seeking to convey messages through individual Members of Congress. As you say, you obviously must make your own decision about travel. The other point is that we have no intentions ourselves of initiating contact with the North under current circumstances. We do not see any benefits that would yield, either in terms of reducing tensions between the North and South, or in terms of promoting more active dialog between them, or in terms of political development in the South.

As I was saying, some aspects of North Korean behavior reflects lack of restraint: their propaganda, diplomatic efforts, their continued infiltration. Why have they not resorted to military assault? I don't know. We can only speculate. I assume it reflects, in part, their respect for American power and our commitment to South Korea; I expect it reflects, in part, their recognition of the defense capabilities of South Korea and the willingness of the people of South Korea to defend themselves.

CHINA'S ROLE

Mr. WOLFF. What I had inferred, there is a position taken by the Chinese particularly.

Mr. ARMACOST. I was going to say it may reflect some doubts on the part of North Korea about the support they could anticipate from their historic backers in the event they provoked a military conflict. I think it is clear that our improved relations with China reflect some shared security concerns in the area, among them the avoidance of any conflict on the Korean peninsula.

I would not exaggerate the degree of coincidence of the Chinese and U.S. views about the Korean issue. They have rather close relations with North Korea. There are many aspects of North Korea's position which PRC representatives endorse publicly. An important point is that North Korea is a very important player in the game. Their ideology is one of self-reliance. They don't take orders from anyone. To the extent we can assess this, the Chinese certainly do

not wish to see a renewal of conflict on the peninsula, and probably would argue against such renewal of conflict.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, could I go back to a previous question?

I realize you are in an uncomfortable position sitting there, but I think if I were sitting down there and the chairman asked me that question if I were able to say it, I would have said it is probably in our best interest to delay that trip. Do you have any trouble with that statement I have just made, particularly considering the activities of the North Koreans at the present time?

Mr. ARMACOST. I did not understand the chairman to be specifically referring to any particular trip.

Mr. GUYER. He was asking about Members making a trip which is already programed.

Mr. GOODLING. I know I am putting you on the spot.

Mr. WOLFF. Not programed, but invitations extended to Members of Congress. Is it an opportune time for us to visit there?

Mr. ARMACOST. I think I would reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that those are decisions to be made by Members of this body. We have neither encouraged nor discouraged such a trip.

Mr. WOLFF. I am going to yield now to Mr. Guyer.

Mr. GOODLING. I think he answered my question with the look on his face and the smile he gave, et cetera.

Mr. WOLFF. I thought the State Department was inscrutable.

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS

Mr. GUYER. Rather than pose a lot of questions, let me in my brief time, because we are subject to call at any time, express just a few of the thoughts in my mind, and I do not expect answers.

The ongoing concerns of most of the people I have talked to are, number one, we know we have a puppet government. Most of us have difficulty knowing who the good guys and bad guys are so far as legitimacy. We do not know by identity, and at least I do not know, or how temporary the surrogate government is.

We notice also that there have been releases of dissidents. We wonder if these have been token releases, or whether they are expressions in good faith of things to come, and the purpose they are trying to accomplish.

Another concern is how, much freedom of the press do we have? You mentioned restraints and some censorship. Are we getting accurate stories from that country?

Another issue, are these target dates, such as the meeting of the Assembly and the chance to vote on a constitution, pretty authentic or are they promissory?

Another one is that we understand the economy has sagged very, very appreciably and, because of the chaos and the unrest, there has been a decline in the productivity, a decline in manufacturing, a definite fall off in exports, and these are concerns because we have also had a rather favorable relationship in balance of payments with this country.

The other is, how authentic is the diplomatic status? In other words, this would relate probably to the chairman's question about North Korea. How stable are things there if our committee decides

to call upon the South Korean Government in the near future? Is there a state of cordiality? Is there a state of relative safety, and so on?

What is the diplomatic status with the Government of Korea and other countries besides us?

I think these are things that we would like to know.

U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL

The other is, what is our present troop strength there now? Could you answer the last question, how many troops do we have now?

Mr. ARMACOST. We have 38,000, give or take a few people. We can correct that with precision for the record.

Mr. GUYER. Would you say that, because of the trouble or of what has happened in recent weeks and months, it sort of mandates now a second look at any plans to further remove troops, so far as the administration is concerned?

Mr. ARMACOST. No. As I have said, we have not felt, in view of our security interests, that we should tamper with the basics of our security relationship, which includes our treaty commitment and deployment of our forces.

Mr. GUYER. I have touched on 10 or 12 points. I know each one may take more than my allotted time. If you have any way of jotting those down and getting back to us, the economy, the employment features, the exports, the manufacturing, the confidence in this government, the real promise of some change in the hearts of the people who have looked for change, something along that line would be very helpful to us.[1]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Hall.

FALLOUT FROM KWANGJU

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Armacost, prior to the Kwangju tragedy, the South Korean military, as I understand it, enjoyed relatively broad support. Since that tragedy, what is the feeling about the South Korean military and what is the feeling in the State Department about the long-term stability of South Korea?

Mr. ARMACOST. With respect to the first question, Mr. Hall, I think it is fair to say that the introduction of airborne special forces units into Kwangju was one of the factors which transformed admittedly large-scale demonstrations into what could be described at the time as a popular insurrection in Kwangju.

There were excesses on the part of those forces. I think, unquestionably, those did generate some disaffection among the people in Kwangju and others, and those are matters which, if continued, would certainly be of concern.

The second point relates to the involvement of the military more generally in the day-to-day management of political affairs. One concern that flows from that is the distraction it necessarily produces

[1] See appendix.

from their professional tasks of maintaining the external defense of the country.

As for the long-term stability of the country, I cannot give a very comprehensive answer at this point. There are obvious factors that would contribute to stability: a common sense of unity in the face of external danger, a common sense of involvement in an economic enterprise from which most segments of Korean society have benefited, although Mr. Guyer has mentioned that the current economic situation is not as bullish as it has been during the past decade and a half. I think there are some of the clearly shared values among most elements of the Korean society.

On the other hand, it is evident from events of recent weeks that there is a desire on the part of many segments of that country to participate, more broadly than was permitted in the past, in the political evolution. Those hopes have been to some extent frustrated by recent events, and whether or not there is long-term stability will depend in part on the accommodations struck between the establishment and opposition groups and the character of the political evolution later in this year.

PRESIDENT CHOI'S PROMISE

President Choi has reaffirmed the Government's intent to carry out constitutional revision and elections. The conditions under which that process will go forward are not entirely clear, and I think the modalities will be very important.

Mr. HALL. What is your assessment of his ability and his promise to have a new constitution and free elections next year?

Mr. ARMACOST. I would feel quite confident that there would be a constitutional referendum later this year, and probably elections. I don't know, quite frankly, what the precise conditions under which those elections or constitutional referendum would be carried out will be. As you know, we expressed our concerns on May 17 precisely about curbs on the political process, the placing of the National Assembly in limbo, the banning of political activity, the closing of universities, and the arrest of major political figures.

Mr. HALL. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Goodling.

KWANGJU BACKGROUND

Mr. GOODLING. Could you give us a little background as to the cause for the problems in Kwangju?

Mr. ARMACOST. Yes. I think, as I said a moment ago, that most observers agree that the single factor that probably was most responsible for turning the student demonstrations into what was virtually a local insurrection was the conduct of some airborne special forces units, units which operated in rather undisciplined fashion. That unit entered Kwangju on the 18th of 19th or May in response to demonstrations after the extension of martial law on the 18th of May, and following the arrest of major political figures.

I might emphasize a couple of points in this connection.

One is that those airborne special units, contrary to some popular misapprehensions, were not under the operational control of the

Combined Forces Commander, General Wickham. Consequently, the question of their release did not arise. We were not consulted about their deployment. We never condoned their deployment or their actions.

JOINT COMMAND IMPLICATIONS

The second point I would make is that in the following week there were requests by the Korean military to withdraw some units from General Wickham's Combined Forces Command, and he concurred in those requests. He did so on the basis of authority reposed in him as the Commander of a joint command.

He was asked essentially to concur on the basis of whether or not the withdrawal of those units would adversely affect the external defense of the country. Since the units in question were general reserve forces and were not on the line, he felt that he could not resist the request.

He is not in a position, as a member of an alliance that is designed to maintain the external defense of the country, to offer judgments—it would be improvident for him to do so—about the use to which such units might otherwise be put. No sovereign nation would tolerate judgments by a foreign country on that kind of question.

The basic point, I think, is that the special forces units were not under his command; they were committed without consultation. The other forces that were involved in Kwangju were general reserve forces, and I think they exhibited a substantial measure of restraint. The final operation was one which was conducted in the middle of the night, when civilians would not be involved. It was, I think, conducted with the kind of prudence which limited civilian casualties.

Mr. GOODLING. Were the special forces released by the United States in October not returned to the joint command?

Mr. ARMACOST. I will have to furnish that for the record. I don't recall any special forces units that were withdrawn that were not returned, but I will have to check that for the record.[1]

Mr. GOODLING. My last question: What control does President Choi have over the destiny of Korea?

Mr. ARMACOST. That is a difficult question to answer. He represents the continuity of civilian government. He is consulted, I think, on all major decisions. I think it is fair to say that the major decisions at this point are developed within a structure in which the military exercises a very dominant voice.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Solarz.

STABILITY IN SOUTH KOREA

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Armacost, given the extent to which you indicated in your opening statement we have an overriding interest in not only the peace, but also the stability of South Korea, how do you respond to the argument that a process of political liberalization in that country could actually lead to instability rather than to stability by creating more opportunities for dissidents and dissatisfied groups to express themselves?

[1] See appendix.

66-498 O - 89 - 3

We saw, for example, what happened in Iran when the Shah began to move rather dramatically toward a new political dispensation in his country, in which SAVAK was curbed, political parties were given the right to register, elections were promised, and the press was permitted more or less freely to criticize the Government.

A number of people have expressed some concerns that if a similar process of liberalization were embarked upon in South Korea, it would have comparable catastrophic consequences.

I do not happen to share this view, but people have expressed it. I think it would be helpful to the committee if you could let us know why, given our interest in stability in Korea at this time, this view is not in our own national interest.

Mr. ARMACOST. You raise a very important, difficult question. Our judgments about what would contribute best to political stability reflected a belief that, in the aftermath of President Park's death, it was inevitable that a new balance would be struck between the requirements of order and the desires for freedom.

As I said in my statement, we had the feeling that the growing complexity of the Korean economy and growing education of the public contributed to demands for some greater popular involvement in the process, and that accommodation of those demands would produce a more stable political structure.

We recognized that along with that process there were risks. I said I thought the twin dangers we recognized at the outset were that if elements of the opposition behaved with a lack of restraint, they could produce reactions, fears of disintegration which would produce the kind of events which we have seen in the past 6 or 8 weeks.

DEMOCRACY AIDS STABILITY

Mr. SOLARZ. Your argument, if I understand it, seems to boil down to the fact that stability is best insured by a broad national consensus within the country on the political arrangement through which the people could be governed. Given the extent to which the Korean people have been educated, as well as the development of the economy, there is growing demand for participation which, if satisfied, would lead to stability. Is that a fair assessment?

Mr. ARMACOST. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. How do you account for the fact there are many other countries in the world, particularly Eastern Europe, where the education level is at least as high as South Korea's, which have complex economies and yet don't have particularly open political systems? Or to take an example closer to home, I gather real strides have been made in improving the educational opportunities of people in North Korea; their economy, I assume, has undoubtedly grown more complex in the last 30 years. Yet, so far as one can determine, they don't seem to be publicly expressing a demand for greater political liberation there.

Of course, the consequences of expressing such demands might be unacceptable to those who express them.

How do you relate your perception of the need for political change in South Korea to the absence of political change in these other countries with comparable educational and economic situations?

Mr. ARMACOST. The linkages are extremely complex. Popular participation in government is not only the aspiration of people in Eastern

Europe or in Korea. I would dare say the Korean economy is more complex and more successful than most European examples you cited.

The methods of imposing governmental discipline are also more rigorous in Eastern Europe by virtue of the kind of mobilization parties that exist and, in some cases, the presence of the Soviet Union with the discipline big brother exercises on some of its neighbors.

I think that in Korea we are not necessarily talking about democratization along particular lines drawn from the West; nor in Korea can we superimpose or impose our values on them.

I do believe that in a complex economy that depends very heavily on its involvement with the West and other market economies, depends very heavily on the judgments of the international investment and business community, and depends for its security upon a continued close and cordial relationship with the United States, that there are other factors operating than one would see in the Eastern European nations you cited.

I would not argue that we are talking about movement immediately to a New England town-meeting style democracy. Clearly, the Koreans, by virtue of the threat they face in the North, by virtue of their own traditions, by virtue of the state of their economic development, might recognize the need for more disciplined governmental arrangements than we might prefer ourselves.

EXTERNAL THREAT VS. DEMOCRACY

Mr. SOLARZ. I have heard that argument since I got here. Of all the arguments, I find that one the least persuasive of all. Israel faced, if anything, a greater threat for 30 years from its neighbors than South Korea has faced, with four and one-half wars, not one war. The very survival of the country hangs in the balance. Through it all they maintained an open, flourishing democratic society.

If they can do it, other countries can do it. We held elections during World War II. I don't mean to denigrate or diminish the threat that South Korea faces. Frankly, I don't find that justification particularly persuasive.

Do you think political liberalization is necessary for stability in North Korea and, if not, why not?

Mr. ARMACOST. I don't think there is any question but that many countries have been able to maintain political stability—if one means by that the absence of overt demonstrations—for long periods of time without widespread popular participation in government.

In South Korea our judgment was that, given the character of that society, given some of their exposure to democratic procedures, given their involvement with the United States, given their dependence upon close economic relationships with the West, some aspirations for wider participation in government existed. That is all I am trying to say.

YUSHIN CONSTITUTION

Mr. SOLARZ. It is our view that progress toward political liberalization is an essential element of stability in a country. Would you consider a constitution pretty much along the lines of the Yushin constitution a manifestation of the kind of political liberalization which we believe is necessary for stability in South Korea, or would we consider that in effect a step backward?

Mr. ARMACOST. I am sorry, a revision along the lines of the Yushin constitution?

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes.

Mr. ARMACOST. My impression is that both elements within the Government and elements outside the Government did anticipate and hope for some modification of the Yushin constitution. As to what those precise modifications would be, we have no clear view.

Mr. SOLARZ. Have we given any thought to the kind of changes that we think should be carried out?

Mr. ARMACOST. I think, Mr. Solarz, that really is a matter for the Koreans and, in our judgment, U.S. reactions must be based on whether or not those adjustments do evoke the support of the people, acceptance by the people.

We are seeking or hoping for arrangements which, as I say, reflect accommodations among key elements in Korean society so that there is stability. That probably does require some greater degree of participation. How much, I can't say.

CHARGES AGAINST KIM DAE-JUNG

Mr. SOLARZ. Have we seen considerable evidence against either of the two Kims who were arrested?

Mr. ARMACOST. Credible evidence?

Mr. SOLARZ. Indicating that they are in fact guilty of what their crimes are alleged to be?

Mr. ARMACOST. I am not aware that the Government of Korea has issued specific charges against Kim Dae-jung, so I can't really say. The concerns we have expressed have been for humane treatment, for access by their families to Kim Dae-jung or other political prisoners.

Mr. SOLARZ. My understanding was that he was alleged to have conspired with the Kwangju rioters to provoke disturbances there. Has that allegation been leveled against him?

Mr. ARMACOST. There have been allegations. Whether those are the charges that will be registered, I don't know.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we have any evidence that would tend to sustain those allegations?

Mr. ARMACOST. I do not wish to comment on that kind of question, Mr. Solarz. We would have to await any bill of particulars in a court. Our concerns have been for humane treatment, for arrangements that would permit the families access to political prisoners, the avoidance of politically motivated trials, excess punishment, things of that sort.

CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

Mr. SOLARZ. Two final questions, Mr. Chairman.

Have we received any assurances from the Chinese with respect to the intentions of North Korea? And what is our reaction to those assurances?

Mr. ARMACOST. I don't think, Mr. Solarz, the Chinese could provide assurances about North Korean conduct because, as I said, North Korea is a very self-reliant country that will speak for itself. They have a judgment about the likelihood of aggressive actions by the North; they would not expect such actions. We would draw our conclusions about that based upon our assessment of inhibitions or

constraints upon North Korea, which include not only our power and the strength of South Korea, but also the questions about support from North Korea's allies, and the likelihood that from a tactical standpoint they may find it more fruitful to attempt to exploit through political means the uncertainties that may exist.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we accept the Chinese analysis that the North Koreans do not intend to attack South Korea, if we disagree with why they may not intend to do so?

Mr. ARMACOST. It is a difficult question.

The North Koreans have continued over a long period of years to seek what we tend to feel would be a position of military paramountcy on the peninsula. They have devoted extra resources to their military establishment. They have never renounced the use of force as a means of promoting their long-term objective of unifying the peninsula on their own terms.

We have not seen evidence earlier that they apparently are making troop movements that threaten imminent military action.

There has been continued infiltration. We see evidence that they hope to exploit political uncertainties in the South.

We were encouraged, actually, by events earlier in the year which might, and still could, give rise to a serious and substantive dialog. Procedural discussions between North and South Korea continue. Even as late as yesterday, they had discussions with their representatives. I think it is fair to say that some of the momentum has slowed down, but that they have continued to talk.

SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ASPIRATIONS

Mr. SOLARZ. Finally, could you give us some sense of the extent to which the people of South Korea are dissatisfied with the existing political situation in South Korea? Obviously, Gallup polls are not being conducted. Clearly, there are some elements in the society that are unhappy, because otherwise we wouldn't have had the Kwangju disturbances.

It is difficult for us to get consensus of how widespread that dissatisfaction is.

In Iran, before the overthrow of the Shah, it was fairly clear to everybody, except our own Embassy, that the Shah had lost the confidence of the people. Would you say that the great majority of the people of South Korea are dissatisfied with the recent trend of events, or is it simply impossible to determine what their attitude is?

Mr. ARMACOST. It is difficult to determine. I think that long-term stability requires political accommodations that have not as yet been finally struck. That is why we will watch very carefully developments over the coming months as this process of constitutional reform and elections unfolds.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, may I make one quick observation?

My African Subcommittee chairman usually makes very profound, well-thought-out statements. We will need an hour sometime for him to explain to me the illustration he used, using Israel in relationship to South Korea. It just blows my mind. Their backgrounds, where they came from, their cultural backgrounds, we will need an hour sometime, because that really blew my mind.

Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentlemen will yield, I will try to do it in 1 minute.

Mr. WOLFF. I think if you will withhold that, because I am not going to get into a discussion of the Middle East while we are in a discussion of this area. This will take time. I am sure you two can get together and you can explain it.

TROOP BEHAVIOR IN KWANGJU

I would like to get back to the question of South Korea and the recent events there.

You did allude to the fact the airborne units were brought into Kwangju. We have heard statements that there were excesses that were committed by the airborne troops.

Do you know whether or not these excesses were committed, acts of brutality were committed with the knowledge of Seoul, or were they individual acts? Have we looked to that, and whether or not there has been any action taken against those who committed these acts?

Mr. ARMACOST. On the first point, Mr. Chairman, I can't comment specifically about the particular knowledge or approval of them by individuals in Seoul. Our concern was that units of this kind, trained for combat with a foreign foe, may not be the most appropriate for involvement in dealing with civil unrest at home.

I think there is no question that their withdrawal on Monday of that week led to a period in which there were active negotiations, and the situation calmed down.

I cannot say specifically whether there were disciplinary actions against individuals. I believe there were some statements by the authorities which in a somewhat elliptical fashion took note of, or acknowledged, possible excesses, but those were not very direct comments.

U.S. POLICY RESPONSE

Mr. WOLFF. The New York Times had a story on the 13th relative to certain actions that have been taken, or lack of action.

A mission by Bruce Llewellyn of OPIC originally set was postponed indefinitely.

A routine meeting of the South Korean Foreign Ministry's strategic planners with the State Department was postponed.

Another economic group headed by John Moore has been allowed to proceed as planned.

The statement has been made, a quotation was made, of some senior State Department official anonymously referred to here, "The message we want to get across is that it is not business as usual between our two countries."

Is that a true indication of our position at the moment? Could you explain any of these actions that have been taken, or lack of action?

Mr. ARMACOST. I think that is a fair statement. Our objectives have not changed in Korea. We obviously have enduring objectives in avoiding renewal of conflict, promoting reduction of tensions, promoting stability through economic prosperity, adequate income distribution, and political arrangements that are acceptable to the public.

The objectives have not changed. Circumstances have changed in recent weeks. Those have prompted us to review our day-to-day dealings with the Korean authorities. We will obviously continue important matters of mutual interest.

U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Mr. WOLFF. Is security also concerned with economic stability?

Mr. ARMACOST. It is, indeed. We have a continued stake in the economic prosperity and growth of Korea. I think a program of punitive sanctions would not contribute either to political liberalization in Korea or to the advancement of our commercial interests.

Mr. Moore went with that in mind. We have large exposure, over $3 billion in the Export-Import Bank. He was not going to approve new loans at the time. Eximbank did not have a lot of money available for new commitments. I think his presence in Korea was a reminder that the international business community does have a large stake in Korea and that they watch developments in Korea in order to make judgments about whether or not investments are appropriate.

The specific trip that was postponed was of Mr. Llewellyn. OPIC has an exposure of around $50 million in South Korea. That has not been rescheduled. Policy planning talks did seem inappropriate under the circumstances. We also yesterday abstained on an ADB loan for Korea, on Inchon port development. As I said, we don't think that a program of punitive sanctions is likely to be helpful, but under the current circumstances and at the present time, I think our abstention does convey a signal of our concern.

F–16 SALES

Mr. WOLFF. In that same article, another official said the United States was determining whether to go ahead with the promised sale of F–16 fighters to South Korea, to which the United States agreed in principle last year, as a successor to the F–4's and F–5's.

What is the status of the F–16 sale?

Mr. ARMACOST. I think, Mr. Chairman, that issue relates to the comments Mr. Guyer was making earlier, about the economic problems faced by Korea as a result of very high inflation rates. As a result of a doubling in the oil bill and as a result of other factors which have produced a growth prospect of 2 percent this year instead of the customary 10 to 15 percent, the availability of funds they have available for defense projects is not what was expected.

The F–16 is a longer term program. It is a very expensive program. They are having to assess at the moment their ability to finance this project, and to that extent we don't confront that issue immediately.

Mr. WOLFF. In other words, this is a decision that would not be our decision, but would be theirs?

Mr. ARMACOST. It would be a mutual decision, a decision on their part, in the first instance, as to when they wish to go ahead, and a decision on our part of when to notify the Congress of our intention to go forward.

TALKS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

Mr. WOLFF. What significance do you attach to the calling off of the North-South talks by the North Koreans? I understand that President Choi did ask, or his representative asked, for a meeting between the two heads of government the two Prime Ministers. That has been postponed now?

Mr. ARMACOST. It has not been broken off. The most recent discussions were on Tuesday of this week, the 24th. The South Koreans did propose moving on to the ministerial level talks. I said earlier that I thought the momentum had slowed down in those talks, reflecting in part, perhaps, some uncertainties in the political sphere in the South.

The next preliminary talks, working level discussions, are scheduled for August 20.

So, there is a slightly longer hiatus between this most recent discussion and the next scheduled discussions, but they will continue.

THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER SITUATION

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Guyer has left, but he and Mr. Hall asked me—and I am very much interested in the situation—if we can shift gears for just a moment. We had a quorum; we don't have a quorum any longer, so we can't go into an executive session on Thailand, but what can you tell us about Thailand at the moment?

Mr. ARMACOST. The situation is one that we regard as very serious. There were incursions along the broad front on the border, penetration of Thai territory of several kilometers; some heavy shelling continues; casualties on both sides which, while modest, are nonetheless matters of concern, 18 or 19 Thais killed in the action yesterday or the day before—over 30 Vietnamese, many civilians—in the hundreds, although we have no precise counts.

The effect of this open hostility on the border has been to disrupt the cross-border feeding operations upon which perhaps hundreds of thousands of Khmers depend for their survival.

The Vietnamese troops, as far as we can ascertain—and I don't have complete confidence in the information on this—have apparently gone back to the Cambodian side of the frontier, but their deployments are directly next to the frontier, and, therefore, there is always the possibility of new incursions.

In any event, their presence there does pose an ongoing problem for the cross-border feeding operations and the distribution of seed, which is important to increase the self-sufficiency of the Cambodians in food production.

Mr. WOLFF. To what do you attribute the Vietnamese burst of activity there?

Mr. ARMACOST. It is difficult to speculate with great confidence. Some of the possible motives may have been those which I mentioned: To disrupt the feeding operation, to intimidate the Thais, to split the ASEAN countries on the eve of the summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, which will be this week.

It might be a reminder of the consequences of failure to accept or acknowledge what they claim is the irreversibility of the situa-

tion in Kampuchea. I can't say with confidence, but I expect those motivations were behind their decision.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO THAILAND

Mr. WOLFF. We have an agreement with Thailand in effect—not, I guess, a mutual defense pact, but we do have an agreement to support the Thais in the event of a threat to their territorial integrity, do we not, and do we consider this still in effect?

Mr. ARMACOST. Yes, indeed we do. It derives from the Manila Pact and it was confirmed bilaterally in the Rusk-Thanat agreement in 1962. It is in effect.

We have reiterated it frequently. We have expressed that commitment in more tangible form through the continued provision of FMS credits, our efforts in recent months to accelerate the delivery of equipment, and through our major efforts in the refugee field which help alleviate the tremendous burden on the Thais in having a large refugee population on their border.

Mr. WOLFF. I know other members of this committee will have questions regarding both Thailand and Korea. I should like to just ask two final questions.

WHEREABOUTS OF KIM DAE-JUNG

No. 1: Do we know the whereabouts and physical condition of the various people who have been incarcerated, and whether or not their families can visit them? I am talking about Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil and the like.

Mr. ARMACOST. No, we do not know their whereabouts.

As far as I am aware, their families have not had access to them.

Mr. WOLFF. Could we request the Department try to update us on this information, whatever information you can get regarding the treatment and situation, of these people?

Mr. ARMACOST. Yes indeed.[1]

Mr. WOLFF. Second, the information that we have been getting out of Korea, the press reports that we have seen, are they fairly accurate reports? In other words, Stars and Stripes and the like, Voice of America, are these accurate reports that they are giving out, that we are being able to elicit from the Koreans?

Mr. ARMACOST. I am not sure I understand which report.

Mr. WOLFF. Are they censored in any way? Are our people censored?

Mr. ARMACOST. You mean American correspondents' reports?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. ARMACOST. I don't believe they are, no. The censorship applies to those materials that are produced and distributed to the Korean public in Korea.

Mr. WOLFF. The reports we are getting from them are accurate reports?

Mr. ARMACOST. I am not sure I know who "them" is. Is it our correspondents operating in Korea?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

[1] See appendix.

66-498 O - 80 - 4

Thank you very much.

Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I understand that the recent clash between Vietnam and Thailand is becoming more than a border clash. This was apparently, as I understand it, a major thrust into Thailand. It is fairly close to Bangkok as I remember.

My question is: Is there any kind of assessment that comes from the State Department relative to what the overall plan is in Vietnam? In other words, how is the State Department treating and assessing the recent thrust in Thailand that appears to me to be more than a border clash?

Mr. ARMACOST. The actual incursion, of course, has been limited to the border areas. It has involved penetration of several kilometers inside Thai territory. We take it very seriously.

The numbers of units that were involved we can't specify with great precision. There were somewhere between several hundred and a couple of thousand. I really can't be more precise than that.

But there are thousands of Vietnamese troops along the border and along a stretch of 50 or more miles. They are deployed directly next to the border. The potential for further clashes exists.

We consider this a very serious matter. We will issue a formal statement this noon, again expressing our concern.

I would expect, Mr. Hall, in going back to earlier comments about our commitment, that the Thai, now having been involved in combat on the border, will have to look even more seriously at the adequacy of their own defenses, and we have been traditionally the principal supplier of equipment. They will probably require additional support. We will have to look at that very seriously in the days ahead.

THAI MILITARY CAPABILITY

Mr. HALL. I was in Thailand a few years ago. I know at that time the Thai military was not the most respected military organization. Is it better today than it was 10 years ago? What is your assessment of the Thai military? Can they handle the situation that is now developing in southeast Thailand?

Mr. ARMACOST. I think that depends on whether or not this was a limited incursion or foreshadows much larger activity along the broader front.

I think there has been progress toward professionalism of the Thai military. General Prem, who is now Prime Minister, attaches great importance to increasing the readiness of the Thai forces. It is quite clear that the Vietnamese, after having been involved in combat for 30 years, have extraordinary proficiency in that field. They do have the advantage in the military balance. Strictly speaking, the military advantages do rest to some degree with the Vietnamese, although they are stretched pretty thin, given their involvement in Kampuchea and the need to protect their northern border.

Mr. HALL. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFF. I take it the Vietnamese have plenty of equipment supplied inadvertently by the United States?

Mr. ARMACOST. There was such inadvertent supply of equipment. I think most of the equipment they are now finding useful is coming from from another source and seems to be coming in in great abundance. The Soviet Union has been a very willing supplier of massive amounts of equipment.

SOVIET EQUIPMENT

Mr. WOLFF. Do we have any indication of the amount of equipment and the type of equipment that has been brought into Vietnam from the Soviets?

Mr. ARMACOST. Yes, we do. I will be happy to supply that for the committee. It involves all types of modern equipment, quantities in the billions of dollars.

Mr. WOLFF. We would ask you to supply that and it will be included in the record.[1]

Any further comments you would like to make, because we are now on a vote, unless Mr. Solarz has other questions?

Mr. ARMACOST. No, Mr. Chairman, I have no further comments.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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[1] See appendix.

UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 28, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLFF. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we engage in the latest in our series of hearings on the situation in South Korea. I think we can all agree that we wish we could discuss more positive aspects of the United States-South Korean relationship.

However, the pace of disquieting events in South Korea continues to exceed our previous considerations, thus reemphasizing our concern for political and social stability there.

Why this should be, in a nation with which we have had the closest of relations for 30 years, I am quite frankly dismayed to note.

REPORT 2 MONTHS AGO

In any event, just 8 weeks ago, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost participated with us in a wide-ranging discussion of the events leading up to the tragic social disorders of May, the arrest of many leading political and intellectual figures, including Kim Dae-jung, and the ever-rising star of General Chun.

At that time, Secretary Armacost indicated that the U.S. Government shared the concerns of the Congress and the American people that the best interests of stability in South Korea would be served by a return to democracy, by a fair and open trial of those arrested, and by leniency in the name of promoting unity among the Korean people.

Among other possibly hopeful signs, Secretary Armacost cited as evidence of potential stability the promise by President Choi to hold a constitutional referendum in the fall and free elections next spring.

UPDATING EVENTS

Today, just 60 days later, President Choi is gone from the scene, supplanted as President by General Chun; Kim Dae-jung and many of his associates are on trial for their lives, and many of the concerns we have been expressing for the past several months remain in the forefront of U.S. concern.

Thus, we welcome today's witness, Hon. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific. Among the many issues we hope he will addresss are the following:

1. According to press reports, you personally, Mr. Holbrooke, authorized General Wickham to return to duty in Korea, despite his previous endorsement of the political ambitions of General Chon. Please outline your reasoning for this step, which certainly seemed to put the seal of approval on General Chun's recent accession to the Blue House.

2. What is the U.S. relationship with General Chun, and is it going to be possible to deal with his government through normal State Department channels?

3. What is the current situation in the many trials, particularly that of Kim Dae-jung, and what have been the responses from Korea to representations of the United States, both governmental and private? Are we continuing to make official representations?

4. What is the present security situation on the Korean peninsula? Do we still face a situation where the security considerations must always take precedence over U.S. political concerns—such as the decision to send General Wickham back to Korea?

5. At what point do domestic South Korean political and social events themselves constitute a security concern for the United States? How do we seek to positively influence or react to such events if Korean leaders know they can always cite the perceived threat from the North, thus evading serious U.S. action? In this vein, is this the proper time to reexamine our military assistance programs to South Korea?

6. From press reports, it would appear that a mission to Korea by Mr. Nimerow, head of the Maritime Administration, was canceled to show U.S. displeasure over events. The same stories indicated, however, that the visit was canceled because it was not thought that he could conduct substantive talks in the present situation.

What kind of a signal is this? How does it stack up against sending General Wickham back into action?

7. With the ascendency of General Chun, and talk of creating a single, 7-year term of service, what is your assessment of the future of democracy in Korea, particularly the ability of the political system to accommodate the growing sophistication and expectations of the Korean people?

8. How well will General Chun and his associates be able to respond to the economic conditions which had beset the past government? In particular, how are they likely to hand'e worker unrest? Will we see a repeat of the sort of force employed against Kwangju, in admittedly somewhat different circumstances?

Let me stress that I do not think it is the responsibility of this committee to pass judgment on a new administration. My concern is the basic question of overall security of South Korea, which includes the internal security as well.

With those questions raised to the Secretary and Admiral Jones, who is accompanying him, I am going to give you time, Richard, to answer the questions; but, before I do ask for the answers, I would like to welcome my colleague, Chairman Bonker, with whom I have

had the pleasure to chair an important series of human rights hearings in Asia earlier this year.

After Don has spoken, I think it would be best to answer the questions that we have posed.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may take the liberty of making an observation, I am delighted to see that our good friend from the State of Washington, having already established his credentials as an expert on Africa and human rights, is now moving into the field of Asia.

I have no doubt that he will contribute as much to our deliberations concerning that part of the world as he did with respect to our debates over Africa.

So it is good to have him here. You know, Mount St. Helens was in his district. Anybody that can still be smiling after that explosion took place obviously is one to reckon with.

Don, we are delighted to have you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DON BONKER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

Mr. BONKER. Thank you both, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Solarz, for your gracious remarks. Rest assured I will not be treading, or if I do, I will tread lightly, in Asia. My concern there is with human rights which are now being violated in South Korea.

We have found a market in South Korea for the export of volcanic ash. I hope nothing I say here will disrupt our economic relations with that country.

Mr. WOLFF. You have much to sell, I guess.

Mr. BONKER. To give away.

I would like to commend the chairman for conducting these hearings and also thank him for the opportunity to speak before his subcommittee. We did conduct joint hearings on human rights violations in non-Communist countries, and there was much discussion of human rights problems in South Korea.

Mr. Chairman, I will keep my remarks very brief.

Those of us who have followed developments in South Korea are concerned about the role of South Korea's military, concerned about the extreme violations of human rights in that country, and concerned about the show trials of dissidents, especially the trial of Kim Dae-jung.

Most would agree that long-term stability and security of Korea can be accomplished by a continuing process of political liberalization.

I am sad to say that process has been harshly interrupted. Today we are witnessing a constitutional and political charade as General Chun attempts to legitimize his rule.

First he takes over the government but leaves in place a figurehead civilian President. Next he savagely represses the opposition. Then he forces the figurehead President to resign. Finally, General Chun resigns from the army and has himself selected as the new President.

We should note, Mr. Chairman that making a mockery out of the constitutional process by observing it in form but not in substance is a disturbing reminder of what happened in Germany as Hitler made his rise to power in that country.

DETERMINATION TO WORK TOGETHER

Several months ago when I visited South Korea, I was impressed by the determination of most segments of Korean society to work together to bring about greater progress toward democracy. Every sign pointed to the direction of instituting a truly democratic system. In meeting after meeting, Koreans from all walks of life, in and out of the Government, expressed the hope that the provisional Government would be able to manage an orderly and constitutional transition under civilian rule. They spoke of looking forward to the constitutional changes and free elections which would give them a new government broadly supported by all segments of Korean society. All of us who advocate the cause of human rights in the world were encouraged by what seemed to be a very promising situation leading to the political liberalization in that country.

SHATTERED HOPES

Now these hopes lie shattered as the Korean military moved quickly to reinstate a severe martial law which curbed the incipient political process, led to the closing of the national assembly and universities, forced the abandonment of all political activity, and led to the arrest of many major political figures.

KIM DAE-JUNG

This is the most disturbing of all because, as the chairman of the subcommittee that oversees human rights policies, I led a delegation to meet with all of the political leaders in that country, including the three Kims. It was Kim Dae-jung who easily stood out as the most popular figure in the country. There seemed to be a growing consensus that if an election were held at any given moment, that it would be Kim Dae-jung who would prevail as a newly elected leader.

I think that is what has caused the military to be concerned and to inhibit the political process; anything that would prevent Kim Dae-jung's election.

Now he is being tried on charges of violating antisedition, anti-security, national security and anti-Communist laws. There is great fear about his safety. The fear is that Kim's show trial will automatically lead to his conviction. Then Kim Dae-jung will either face a certain long-term confinement or execution.

As a recent editorial in the New York Times of August 18 notes:

> Most Americans who care about South Korea are dismayed by General Chun's brutality and look upon his show trial of Kim Dae-jung as morally indistinguishable from what passes for justice in Communist North Korea.

The State Department has characterized the charges against Kim Dae-jung as "farfetched." Most observers of the sorry state of events in South Korea are very concerned that Kim Dae-jung will not receive a fair trial. The fact that international observers from Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists have been prohibited from attending his trial and the fact that its proceedings are being censored only help to underscore those fears.

SECURITY DEPENDENT ON STABILITY

South Korea's national security is dependent on stability and stability can be best insured by a broad national consensus. In fact, South Korea's future growth and development are dependent on the support of the people rather than on measures which restrict their civil and political liberties.

If the South Korean Government is perceived by its own people as a renegade government, who will defend it if an emergency should arise?

Facing a hostile enemy, how will it survive if its own population is hostile as well?

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced there are only two ways this administration can send a message to South Korea.

Based on my visit there—and both of you have been there recently—there are two major interests or concerns in the country. One is with their security and the other is with their economy, and it we are going to back our words with any kind of action, we are going to have to direct our efforts in a way that will be more effective. I am not certain that we ought to interfere in any sense with the security requirements of that country at this time, though I think their security problems might be internal as well as external, but I do think we can send messages through economic measures.

The Eximbank that we passed upon the other day has reserved, I believe, $400 million in Eximbank credits for South Korea. If the State Department so chooses, with the President's blessing, we can block those funds and send a message to General Chun, that the United States will not tolerate the steps of repression that we are now seeing in that country.

I would hope that through these hearings the committee could press the State Department and this administration to act more effectively to bring about a continued liberalization of that country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. I thank the chairman for his statement. We have had the second bell, so the vote is on in the House.

The committee will stand in recess until we have voted.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. WOLFF. The subcommittee will resume.

We will now hear the testimony from the esteemed Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to return before your subcommittee and discuss, accompanied by my colleagues from the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the difficult current situation in Korea.

I do not have an opening statement. I will confine my remarks to two basic points:

The situation in Korea has been exceedingly difficult, as both of you know, since the death of President Park Chung Hee in October of last year.

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Our policy has been guided by an attempt to balance, adjust, and reconcile, when there is some internal conflict, two central guiding principles.

STABILITY IN REGION

The first one is our continuing belief that stability and maintenance of the present strategic balance in Northeast Asia is an overwhelming interest to the United States and is in our own national security interests.

In that regard, I would note, as has been noted often before, that this is an area that has been in perpetual conflict and the source of great power rivalry since at least 1905.

These tensions are at a lower point today than they have been at almost any other point in the 20th century. It is in our interests to see that that low level of tension is maintained, particularly since there are heightened tensions in many other parts of the world, such as Southeast Asia. We do not want to see tension rise in that area.

We believe that along with normalization between the United States and the People's Republic of China, the continuation of the American security commitment to the Republic of Korea is an essential part of that strategy.

BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT

The second part of our policy is our concomitant belief that a broadly based government in Seoul is an important part of the long-range stability and security of the Korean Peninsula.

We will use what influence and leverage exists and is available to the United States to encourage events and actions that move in that direction.

Our leverage is necessarily limited. The Republic of Korea is a sovereign country with many proud accomplishments in its recent past, and the easy assumption on the part of many people that the United States writ runs from here to Seoul and to the 38th parallel in the political field is simply not true.

Our influence is real, but limited. We will use it to encourage movement in the direction I have specified, and we share the concerns expressed by you in your opening statement and by Mr. Bonker in his statement.

OBJECTIVES NOT IN HARMONY

The day-to-day adjustment of that policy, especially when those two objectives are not in total harmony, is a very difficult process. In that regard, I am pleased to say that cooperation between the State Department, the Defense Department, the White House staff, the command in Seoul, and the Embassy in Seoul, has been exceptionally good under conditions of great stress.

I think it reflects a higher degree of coordination and cooperation than any previous period over the last 20 years. There is a long history of tensions within the U.S. Government over the Korean issue. Those tensions are not in the structure at this time.

So within that framework and with an outstanding team on the ground, Ambassador William Gleystaen and Gen. John Wickham,

with close cooperation here in Washington, we will continue to proceed within the framework of those objectives as I have just laid them out.

I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Mr. WOLFE. Thank you, Mr. Holbrooke.

I would just like to review for a moment. There were some specific questions that I have already posed. I would like to try to elicit some answers from you on those.

There seems to be a situation where we have two high ranking military officers—and this is not directed at them personally—but we have had some difficulty in the past in which—and I am not talking about Korea now; I am talking for the United States—in which political decisions were made by the military that got us into an awful lot of trouble.

That was compounded by the fact that people in political life were entering into the military area and making the military decisions.

CONFUSING STATEMENT BY GENERAL WICKHAM

Now a statement supposedly was made by General Wickham that is a very confusing statement, because this actually has been leading certain people in Korea or this country to believe that the military is making policy decisions for us.

I would like to ask you, is it accurate to attribute that statement to General Wickham to the affect that under any circumstances we would not restrict our assistance to Korea?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I am glad you raised the question on the statement.

I would like to say, first, that I do not agree with the characterization in the opening statement that refers to him as having made a "previous endorsement of the political ambitions of General Chun."

Mr. WOLFF. I don't want to get into the whole question of the personalities that exist in Korea. It is not a question of endorsing General Chun or anything else like that.

I just want to know whether or not it is a decision of the administration that because of the security considerations, regardless of any action that is taken by anyone in Korea, that this would not influence our decisions, our political decisions in the future?

WICKHAM'S ROLE

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I would like to answer on two levels.

First, with regard to general Wickham. You mentioned him in your opening statement and then in regard to the other question.

With regard to General Wickham, he is first of all an integral part of the integrated State/Defense/White House policymaking team that I referred to earlier.

He is involved and consulted in all decisions regarding our policy toward Korea.

The line that you accurately describe between political and military decisions is an overlapping one, and we all recognize that. Political actions have strategic security and military implications, and military and strategic implications have political implications in Korea as elsewhere.

General Wickham has been an integral part of the team and is not, to my mind, remotely related to previous American generals going back over 30 years who have on occasion said things which have really created a question about a civilian/military split in Korea.

The specific remarks you have referred to are, I believe, subject to some misinterpretation, and I do not think it is——

Mr. WOLFF. I wonder if you could tell us what the remarks and your interpretation of these remarks is?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I do not have before me the exact quotes that you are referring to. I can assure you that General Wickham has operated as part of the American team and as part of the policy guidelines laid down by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State.

I want to stress the full confidence that everyone in the executive branch has in him as the commander.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Mr. WOLFF. Let me go beyond that for a moment. Let me ask you the question: Is there any point or any circumstance that could possibly exist in the future—are there any circumstances that you could forecast that would override the security considerations that we have in Korea?

In other words, are the security considerations the preeminent considerations, so that we would acquiesce to anything that happens internally, based upon the overriding security concern?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I don't see how one can consider the situation in Korea without taking the security situation into central account.

Mr. WOLFF. Well, let's take a very, very remote possibility such as a massacre in Korea of civilians. I am not saying that there is or will be or anything else like that. I only am trying to define if there is anything at all that you see that could override the external security concerns?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I think—I do not wish to try to get into a prioritization of these two factors.

Mr. WOLFF. We have to. That is basically what is at point here.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No. If you force a choice between the two, I believe that you end up with a policy which is against our national interests. The fact is, we are deeply concerned about the trend of political events as described by Mr. Bonker in his statement. I would not quarrel with the general characterizations of his statement. We are deeply concerned with that and we believe and have stated publicly and privately that these run counter to what we think are the long-range interests in Korea.

But the bifurcation that you describe is, to my mind, contrary to a coherent policy or to our national interests.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. WOLFF. Let me ask you a further question.

I think this is in line with overall foreign policy. In foreign policy considerations, we have made a very strong point of human rights as part of the keystone of this administration policy throughout the world.

Are we going to in any fashion or do we in any fashion, in factoring into the determinations that we make on relations with countries, do we factor security above the human rights considerations?

In other words, I mentioned a very obscure and remote situation such as a massacre.

Now, if there were a massacre, a large number of people—again, I don't think that is even remotely possible in Korea—but if the situation did arise that there was a massacre of a large number of people, would the overriding concern of our country be the security consideration, or would we have some reservations and second thoughts about continuing relations, as we have, for example, Idi Amin, not to compare the two, mind you.

I just want to make a determination about how you feel about this. I think it is vital to our considerations as to whether or not General Wickham was speaking for the overall policy of this country or whether or not you have any reservations about that at all?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, I want to stress that General Wickham is operating within and as part of American policy and, on the other hand, the specific remarks that have caused the controversy were because of the way they were understood and represented, perhaps somewhat out of context, unfortunate.

I would prefer, however, to go back to your central question because I don't believe that General Wickham's roll is as important or intriguing in this context as has perhaps been represented.

I think he is operating within the structure, and I think that this particular interview you are referring to is significant in quite a different way.

I would like to outline what I mean.

DISTORTION IN PRESS

One of our largest concerns, Mr. Chairman, has been the distortion, sometimes the deliberate distortion of American policy positions by the leadership of the Republic of Korea in recent months.

I believe General Wickham's interview was part of that pattern, and I want to assure you and Mr. Solarz and your colleagues that this issue is one of our highest priorities at present. We do not believe it is compatible with the close relations between longstanding treaty allies and between the United States and a country in which some 33,000 Americans shed their blood a generation ago to see the public statements of American officials, including on occasion the President himself, misrepresented to the Korean people.

We are concerned about that and I would like to use this occasion to make that concern quite clear.

I mention the connection with General Wickham because his remarks are among those which I believe have been misinterpreted, and I am not convinced that the misinterpretation was inadvertent in the recent past.

I would also like to stress that we share the concern of you and your colleagues. Concerning the trend toward broadly based government, the trend which Mr. Bonker described has not continued.

We understand the problem that you have discussed, and American officials in Washington and Seoul are participating in efforts to encourage movement in that direction.

We also share the concern of your committee concerning Mr. Kim Dae-jung, and to that effect we have, within the last week, done something which I don't believe has been publicly reported.

We have augmented our Embassy in Seoul with a member of the legal adviser's office in the State Department, a lawyer, who is assisting the Embassy in observing the trial and helping us come to judgments on how that trial is proceeding.

On all three of the issues that I have just mentioned—representation of the American position to the Korean people, the trial of Kim Dae-jung, and the general efforts for broadly based government in Korea—our concerns are clear.

All of that, I believe, must also be taken within the context of my earlier remarks about strategic stability and security in the peninsula.

I recognize the complexity of that equation, but Korea has always been a complex place, and if either side of this equation is subordinated excessively to the other, I believe the imbalance would be extremely disadvantageous to the United States.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Mr. WOLFF. Well, how about the question of internal security? Do you give any credibility at all to the idea that the internal security of the country is just as important as the external security? I mean, we have some lessons from Iran, not that they are directly comparable again, and I don't want to be misinterpreted in the statements that I have made or the questions that I pose to you.

I am posing these to you in almost an abstract sense rather than in the specific example about Korea because I would like to try to get some of the thinking of the administration regarding some of these things.

We talk about the question of security. There is a very important factor that the erosion of Iran took place from within, not from without, and, therefore, I wonder whether we have learned any lessons from that?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Is the question whether we learned any lessons from Iran?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I am surely not the right person to ask.

Mr. WOLFF. The question I pose is the question of internal security and whether or not you have factored this into the total equation.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I think we have, Mr. Chairman. We recognize the mix of issues and we recognize the problems of the internal situation in Korea.

KOREAN ELECTIONS

Mr. WOLFF. One point that I should like to make is that we had a visit from, I am not sure of the exact title, the Secretary General to the President, President Choi, who was here and indicated to us that the new Government would move toward general elections in a quicker time frame than President Choi had originally indicated. I made the point that in an election, you have to have candidates. Most of them seem to have been put out of the picture, at least for the present.

I am just wondering who the candidates will be in the next election.

I would like to see if you can answer that.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I think you are referring to the former Secretary of the Blue House, Mr. Choi Kwang-soo, who was replaced today. We spent a lot of time with him last week also. Last week he was the Secretary General.

Mr. WOLFF. Did you get any idea of any other candidates for office?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. He didn't mention any candidates at all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Would you like to forecast who is going to win the election? [Laughter.]

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I had a feeling that—no, I would not want to get involved in the political prognostication in Korea.

Mr. WOLFF. I don't think, very frankly, we should get involved in the internal policies of Korea on that score either. I just mention this in passing because there are signs that I think a clear understanding of U.S. policy will be helpful to the Koreans in formulating their policies for the future. That is what I have proposed on that.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree with you more. I think this hearing, the meeting you and your colleagues had with Mr. Choi Kwang-soo, your public statements, the editorial comment that has been made in the United States, very importantly, the public and private statements of members of the executive branch, all show a striking degree of parallelism.

The emphasis may shift from person to person and institution to institution, but everybody is sending the same message. I think that is helpful in this context. I think your talks with Mr. Choi were helpful in that regard.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you.

Mr. Solarz.

REPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, let me say at the outset that in my own view the Republic of Korea has embarked on a course of action which is fraught with peril for the future relationship between our two countries. As someone who has been deeply committed to the political independence and territorial integrity of South Korea, I fear that the continued repression of the human rights and political liberties of the South Korean people could significantly jeopardize the willingness of the people of our own country to continue supporting the security commitment which we have had to the Republic of Korea for three decades now.

I very much hope that somehow or other the new leadership in Seoul can be brought to its senses because if they continue to act in the way they have, they may very well produce a situation which is in neither of our interests.

Now, I gather over the course of the last 30 years that the United States has enjoyed a fairly good reputation in South Korea. Any American who has been there knows how appreciative the South Korean people have been of all of the help we have given them over the years and our continued willingness to come to their defense.

To what extent have the actions of the last few months and their reporting in the controlled Korean press contributed to the emergence of any significant measure of anti-Americanism in South Korea?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That is a question I can't answer in a quantifiable or even yet an authoritative way, Mr. Solarz, but your raising it is important enough because the mere fact that you have raised it and, I think posed it in precisely the terms that we are posing it to ourselves, suggests an area of new and great concern.

I hope, quite sincerely, that what you and Mr. Wolff are saying today will be heard in Korea for precisely that reason.

I can't guarantee that it will be. I can tell you for a fact that my last interview in Asian Affairs, and the Asian Wall Street Journal was censored in Korea so that the page of the newspaper in which it appeared looked like a cutout doll.

Any time anything of Korea was involved, it had been scissored out. It must have been a lot of work for somebody to cut with scissors in the middle of the page. There were about 10 omissions in a full-page interview.

Even President Carter's own remarks have been edited and misrepresented in Korea.

To the extent that those misrepresentations and editings mislead people in Korea as to our policy, and by misleading people contribute to a rise in negative feelings about the United States, that is a significant new and negative factor in the equation.

I can't however, quantify it, but you have raised it in precisely the terms which all of us, civilian and military, share.

NOT READY FOR DEMOCRACY

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, there are a number of people who have argued that because of their Confucian tradition, their volatile tendencies and the absence of any genuine democracy for the last three decades that, in fact, South Korea is not ready for democracy. How do you respond to that point of view?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I am really not qualified to tell other people what they are ready for or what they are not ready for.

Each country has to decide that for themselves.

I have felt on my trips to Korea, other countries in Asia, indeed some 80 or 90 countries over the last 10 years, in my travels both in and out of the Government, that that kind of generalization, coming from other people outside Korea, foreigners, is a little bit too glib.

I think there is a range in every country. There are probably people in our country who probably aren't ready for democracy yet. We have one and I think it is a good system.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you believe South Korea is capable of democracy?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I——

Mr. SOLARZ. Capable of sustaining a democratic form of government?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. My private views are really not—it is not desirable in my view for me to express my personal views on a thing like that while I hold this job, but I think the Koreans have to decide those things for themselves. There is logically only one way to decide that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the establishment of a democratic government would tend to promote stability or instability in South Korea?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I am not sure—you mean democratic with a capital "D" or small "d", Mr. Solarz?

Mr. SOLARZ. Small "d".

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I can't answer that question. I really honestly don't know. It is too broad a question in the way you have posed it for me to answer it in the way that you are suggesting.

I think in both halves of Korea today, in different ways, in different forms, popularly based representative governments—and I am evading the word "democratic" deliberately—are lacking, but in very different ways.

I think we have made very clear our concern about the trend in recent months in the South.

FORMS OF DEMOCRACY

Mr. SOLARZ. There are obviously many forms of democracy. There are parliamentary systems and presidential systems. In some the executive is more powerful, in others less powerful. But by a democratic form of government I mean a government which is ultimately responsive to the people it serves and which can, if the people so choose, be replaced when elections are held.

If we don't believe that such a government would promote stability in Korea, and if the South Korean people are not ready for such a form of government, then what are we making such a fuss about in terms of the current situation?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I am sorry, but I can't respond to your comment in exactly the way that you might desire because I have a deep personal reluctance to make pronunciamento about what other forms of government other countries should take in that degree of specificity.

I do feel that a government which is broadly based, with the involvement and participation of the people, whatever its form, is essential to the long-run stability of South Korea.

Mr. SOLARZ. What do you mean by a broadly based form of government?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I would deliberately avoid becoming more specific. Countries have to choose forms which are applicable to their own traditions and values. Those can vary.

GOVERNMENT NOT BROADLY BASED

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, you have become more inscrutable than the people in the part of the world with which you deal.

Would you say that the Government of President Chun is broadly based?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No.

Mr. SOLARZ. Why not?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. First of all, the Government today is not precisely the Government of last week nor precisely the Government of next week or next year.

The Government is in the process of a transition in a direction which is still unclear and about which we have expressed concern.

Second, the events since December 12 and particularly since May 27 have hardly broadened the base of support of the leadership in Seoul at this point.

Now, having said that, I want to stress that the returns are not in definitively yet. I hope that all of us in this room will recognize a very key point which is that with the impending inauguration of General Chun as the President of the Republic of Korea, an event which will take place in less than a week, we all should watch carefully—and I cannot stress this enough, Mr. Solarz—as to whether or not the new Government—and I stress the word "new"—will or will not move in the direction which is implicit in your questions.

Mr. SOLARZ. But at the moment you would say it is not broadly based?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That is correct.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is it narrowly based?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Is it narrowly based.

SUPPORT OUTSIDE MILITARY

Mr. SOLARZ. Is there any indication of support for this Government outside of the military?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. From where?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. There are elements within the business community, within the bureaucracy, and elements in both the rural and urban sectors which find this Government preferable to previous governments.

I think we would be deluding ourselves if we thought that this was just two or three people, but in the sense you meant broadly based, we have stated publicly in the past that we think the movement in that direction is essential and at this point inadequate.

CHUN'S ELECTION

Mr. SOLARZ. I gather General Chun was elected unanimously by the Seoul electoral college, is that correct?

Mr. PALMER.[1] No, sir. There was one vote that was cast out as being invalid.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I will defer to Mr. Palmer whose knowledge of the democratic procedures of South Korea exceeds mine.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know if this was a secret ballot?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Totally secret.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you know why there were no dissenting votes?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Do I know why there were no dissenting votes? I don't know, no, Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Even better than Stalin used to do when he ran in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Secretary, just one or two additional questions.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Maybe General Chun is more popular than Mr. Stalin was.

U.S. POLICY UNDER REVIEW

Mr. SOLARZ. You indicated that we expressed our concern to the South Korean Government over the trend and events in their country.

[1] Staff director, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Are we prepared, in fact, to consider taking any specific actions to reinforce those representations such as, for example, adopting the recommendation that Mr. Bonker made concerning Eximbank loans, or possibly considering the withdrawal of our forces from South Korea? Are there any specific actions we have in mind?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. In that regard, Mr. Solarz, most aspects of our Korean policy have been under intense review for several months, precisely because of these factors.

We are not reviewing at this point the security relationship in direct relationship to this issue, although I would remind you on July 20, 1979, President Carter said that he would review the entire troop withdrawal policy again, or it would be reviewed in 1981.

But other aspects of the relationship are under continual review. Therefore, some trips previously planned have come forward. Some trips have been deferred, delayed, or canceled. Some travel plans have been affected. Some travel plans have gone forward.

Mr. SOLARZ. Other than travel plans and diplomatic representations, are there any specific measures we have taken to convey our concerns?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Under the law, we must take into account these issues in determining our voice and vote in the international financial institutions. This is being done through the committee headed by Deputy Secretary Christopher.

Mr. SOLARZ. No decisions have been made?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes. We have already abstained on some loans and actions related to these events, and an additional set of loans are under consideration now.

I would stress, however, that in the loan issue we have to take into account, under the understandings with Congress, both the human rights issue and the so-called basic human needs issue.

EXIMBANK

Mr. SOLARZ. What about on the Eximbank question?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. On Exim, we have so far not adjusted or changed our policy, although I do stress that it is not business as usual with Korea across the board.

On Exim it has been our view so far—and I would welcome the advice of your committee on this—that to affect the Exim-loan procedures to Korea, with the almost certain multiplier effect that it would have on the private lending institutions in New York and elsewhere, would have an overall adverse effect on the economy of Korea without addressing the issue of your concern.

If that happened, the only loser would be the Korean people whose economic progress has leveled off in any case in the last year.

ASYLUM POLICY

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, I think you did a remarkable job in terms of making it possible for Mr. Aquino from the Philippines to come to our country.

In the event Kim Dae-jung should be convicted, is there any possibility that he might be offered some form of asylum or refuge in our country? Would we be prepared to——

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I have no question whatsoever if Mr. Kim Dae-jung were in a position to come to the United States that he would be welcomed here in the same way as other people in similar circumstances.

In regard to Mr. Aquino, I think it is very important to note that he, as well as Father Delatore and other people who were previously in Fort Bonafacio jail in Manila are now in the United States, and that they are all here now in one way or the other because of the actions of President Marcos.

I am glad that you have raised that issue. Those of us who have had a chance to meet Mr. Aquino have discussed it with him. He himself has stated that he owes his life to President Carter's human rights policy. I hope that this precedent is noted elsewhere in the world.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you believe the charges against Kim Dae-jung are trumped up?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I would simply repeat what the State Department spokesman has said previously on that. I don't recall his exact words, but I think that he has made clear that they were—that these charges did not, on their first reading, appear to be more—I believe he even used the word "farfetched," if I am not mistaken.

TRIP TO NORTH KOREA

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question.

Chairman Wolff has really indulged me way beyond my time. I do appreciate it.

About a month and a half ago, in another hearing of the committee, some questions were put to one of your deputies concerning a possible congressional trip to North Korea. Since that colloquy, such a trip took place, as you might know.

At the time, your Deputy indicated that the Department was neither encouraging nor discouraging anyone in the Congress from going to North Korea.

Now that the trip has taken place, do you have any view on what transpired and whether it was useful or in any way contributed to progress in that situation?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I would say, first, Mr. Solarz, while we neither encouraged nor discouraged your trip to North Korea, we did encourage your return from North Korea.

Mr. SOLARZ. You will be interested to know that I told Kinn Il-sung that if he wanted President Carter reelected, all he had to do was keep me hostage.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Those of us who discussed the trip with you and your traveling companion read the newspaper accounts. I think all feel that it was an interesting trip, that your reports were very useful to us; certainly provided one of the most extended insights into the thinking of Kim Il-sung and his colleagues in the DPRK,—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—that is North Korea. And that some of the points he made to you were old, some were slightly new, some were revised from previous forms, but that they bore further examination.

I am particularly gratified that you also went to South Korea, the People's Republic of China, and took on a very busy schedule. I think it was the Johannesburg-Pyongyang shuttle, if I am not mistaken.

I think that the trip was interesting and useful in that context, and I see no negative effects of the trip, and I mention that specifically because there was concern expressed on that; and I do repeat, of course, that it was an action by you not involving the executive branch, and, as you and I have discussed, both before and after the trip, you were not carrying any messages from us or carrying any specific ones back, but we have followed the trip and its results with great interest.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Solarz.

Mr. Secretary, I think the one aspect of all of this on which we agree is that we do not wish to send the wrong messages. In discussing these questions, we are dealing with problems that exist between two friendly nations, and if I recall correctly, it was because the wrong signals were sent that the Korean war because a reality.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. It is not clear to me, Mr. Chairman, that that is a certainty. I think we—I would only say on that point that it is one of the most debated issues in the last 30 years.

Mr. WOLFF. Perhaps we might say that one aspect of it were the incorrect assumptions by North Korea based upon certain statements that were made here as to the response that the United States would make or take. I would not want that situation to come forth from this committee—that there would be a misinterpretation on some score by the North Koreans.

ROLE OF JAPAN

I would like to get to certain questions as a result of some of the information that we have received. What role have the Japanese been playing in the overall situation in Korea?

There have been statements made that alluded to the fact that there was support for some of the people involved in the riots, support from Japan. There were also some indications that there has been a constant interest by some overseas Koreans who have residences in Japan, that they are involved in some of the political processes.

I just wondered whether or not you could discuss this, and also the reactions of the Japanese to the events that have taken place in recent date with as the takeover of the Government by General Chun?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I am very reluctant to characterize Japanese attitudes in detail. I think they must speak for themselves and I think it is highly inappropriate for me——

Mr. WOLFF. What has been the input that you have gotten? You fellows get so many cables over there, I don't see how you can read them all.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I don't.

Mr. WOLFF. You don't read the cables?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I don't have time, Mr. Chairman. I am busy testifying. [Laughter.]

The Japanese position—I really don't feel I can go into the details of the Japanese position. I really think they have to speak for themselves. However, we have talked about the situation with them from time to time. They have their own interests in Korea. They have expressed them as they felt appropriate, occasionally with public statements or private emissaries. They and the United States, I

think, share the same view that stability in Korea is directly related to stability in Northeast Asia.

My opinion is they also have observers at the trial of Kim Dae-jung.

TRIAL OF THE THREE KIMS

Mr. WOLFF. I think when we talk about the trial of Kim Dae-jung, we severely limit the situation.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I agree with that completely.

Mr. WOLFF. I don't think we should just use this as a single area of interest. I think our interest generally is seeing that they get a fair and open trial. I think that is what our position should be. I don't think we should pass judgment as to what the ultimate outcome should be, but I do think that it is important that we attempt to convince the Korean Government that there should be fair and open trials of the people who are involved.

I wonder what representations we are making on that score?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Once again I think it would be inappropriate to go into the details of private diplomatic representations.

I think our presence at the trial, the augmentation of our Embassy temporarily with a lawyer from Washington sent at the express instruction of Secretary Muskie——

Mr. WOLFF. Have you had any difficulty or has the Department had any difficulty in attending the trials?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. We have not had any difficulty, but other organizations and groups and journalists apparently have.

Mr. WOLFF. Does the Department monitor all of the trials?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes. At a significant level in the Embassy plus, as I stressed, again—and I don't believe we have previously made it public—with a lawyer from Washington sent at Secretary Muskie's specific direction.

Mr. WOLFF. Do you have access at all to the people who are on trial? Have you attempted to get access to them?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. The answer to the second question is yes. The answer to the first question is limited, but not zero.

Mr. WOLFF. OK.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. But these are all areas of great concern?

Mr. WOLFF. It was said that the people who are on trial had difficulty in obtaining attorneys. I was visited by the chairman of the Catholic Conference the other day who indicated that they had very severe difficulties in getting attorneys, and that only 2 days before the trial were the attorneys made available.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes.

INADEQUATE CONSULTATIONS

Mr. WOLFF. Do you know whether that situation has improved at all? Do all the people have attorneys?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. It has improved, but my understanding is essentially the same as yours.

I think there was inadequate—the defense felt there was inadequate consultations in advance; that the defendants came into the trial not able to coordinate their strategy with the defense attorneys. There

were some shifts in personnel, but recently our own people in Seoul have had some good talks with the defense attorneys which has increased our understanding.

The newspaper reporting has indicated a general evolution of the action of the defendants which suggests to me that the answer to your question is things have improved in that relatively narrow frame recently.

Mr. WOLFF. One aspect of all of this has been the interest that this committee had in the trials that were held in Taiwan over the Kaoshiung incident. Noting only as a result of our interest, but as a result of the fact that there were strong representations made all along, it has been indicated in the press that these trials were fairly open, and that they had been the first open political trials that had been held on Taiwan for many a year.

In a similar vein, therefore, we do hope that the Korean Government understands that our interest in seeing to it that there are open and fair trails is in the interests of the people and our joint interests in the overall relations that exist between our two countries.

REMARKS ON TAIWAN

While we are on the question of Taiwan, we had a discussion the other day, Mr. Pritchard and I, relative to statements made regarding Taiwan, and the statements that were made by Mr. Reagan, which have been subsequently commented upon again.

We have asked—in the responsibility of oversight, we have asked Mr. Reagan to come to testify before this committee. We have asked Mr. Bush to make a determination, since this is part of the continuing oversight of the committee as to clarification, because there has been a great misinterpretation, I think, in the newspapers as to the impact of this.

I wonder if you could tell us what——

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman. This is a new statement. I hadn't heard this. The committee has asked those people to come?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Was this you who did it? The committee?

Mr. WOLFF. The committee did this about—when was it, John? [Discussion off the record].

Mr. PRITCHARD. We always have such good hearings, but I don't see what in the world we are going to be doing in the middle of a Presidential campaign.

Do we intend to do this in the next couple of weeks?

Mr. WOLFF. Whenever the individuals are available.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, I am never one to put a sour note into the proceedings, but I would just have to say that I see little that will be gained by calling in a couple of Presidential candidates in the middle of a campaign at a time——

Mr. WOLFF. We will give equal time to President Carter.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Equal time doesn't matter. They are running a campaign. The statement was made. I didn't agree with the off-the-cuff statement. Governor Reagan has issued a statement which I think clarifies the situation, and I think to ask them to come here now is a

mistake. I think it is very important that the State Department does not get involved with political statements.

I really think that subject has pretty well been handled. The statement was made. There has been a flurry over it. I think maybe it was sort of tailormade for the Chinese to be able to overreact, because I think they wanted to make some points.

I think everybody knows what has beeen said, what has been clarified, and I certainly would have to say, Mr. Chairman, that I would really object, and as you know, I hardly ever object to what you do. We are good friends. These people have schedules, and I am not aware in the past that Presidential candidates have been hauled up in front of congressional committees. I am not aware of it.

I tell you, I am going to go to the battlefront on this thing, because I think that we have other things to do.

IMPACT OF GOVERNOR REAGAN'S REMARKS

Mr. WOLFF. Well, Mr. Pritchard, we have continuing oversight hearings that we are running on Taiwan. In line with that, we felt that because of the impact of any statements that are made here, regardless of whether it is in a Presidential campaign or not, that the impact of those statements and the impact meaning of those statements should be well known to the American public.

Unfortunately, what has happened is that there has been an effect felt in both Taiwan as well as in the People's Republic of China that I would like to ask Mr. Holbrooke about because I thought I was doing a good turn to the Republicans by providing them a platform.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I am sure you did. I think there are better platforms than hauling them before congressional committees.

Mr. WOLFF. We are not going to haul them. We just invited them.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think that is out of line. I have to say so. Everybody knows what is going on. Everybody knows what was said.

The statement has been clarified. I don't think we have to get into this flap. I doubt that anybody is going to show up, and I think—I won't even drag Mr. Holbrooke in. I don't think we ought to drag any of these people in.

Mr. WOLFF. We have to drag Mr. Holbrooke in. We had a witness who appeared only a few days ago and mentioned Mr. Holbrooke's name.

Mr. PRITCHARD. You heard me defend the Foreign Service, didn't you, at that time? I stood up and defended the members of the Foreign Service because I took objection to his approach.

REACTION OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Holbrooke, I wonder if you would just comment?

There have been repercussions since this whole flap. If you notice, the statement I made said that I think this thing was blown out of all proportion to its impact.

I think my colleague on the other side on the aisle knows that, but I wonder if you can give us an indication of what has transpired? What has been the reaction in the People's Republic of China? What has been the reaction in Tiawan?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. My impression, Mr. Chairman, is that the Chinese did not wish to get involved in the Presidential campaign.

In fact, they told me that flatly when I was there with Senator Byrd in early July.

The question, therefore, arises—and it is a very important one to consider—as to why they have made a series of public statements, including right up to this morning, of continuing strong objections to the positions taken by some people in recent weeks.

I believe that the issue for them is not as technical as the debate over official relationship, governmental relationship, liaision offices, and so on.

I think their major concern is whether or not the relationship between the United States and the people of Taiwan would be upgraded or not under different future outcomes, both in November and in regard to factors not related to the Presidential campaign.

You well know from the People's Republic of China public reaction to my testimony before this subcommittee in this room on June 11, testimony to which the People's Republic of China objected strongly, that the People's Republic of China objection was not to an individual person, but to a position of what they—how they would react to any upgrading of United States-Taiwan relationships.

They objected to my testimony on June 11, not in as strong terms as they have objected recently to other statements that have been made, but that is because of the nature of the difference between my testimony before you of June 11 and the statements that have been made more recently.

We have said that the basis of the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China comes from the joint communique of December 15, 1978, announcing normalization which, in turn, derives from the principles of the Shanghai communique between President Nixon and Premier Chou En Lai in February of 1972, and that we will adhere scrupulously to the Taiwan Relations Act in governing the people-to-people relationship between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan.

If that position is changed, it doesn't matter by whom, the People's Republic of China has said that it will react. It will have an adverse consequence. That is the gist of Ambassador Woodcock's statements 2 days ago from Peking. I would just like to say that the press reported that this was an unusual statement by an American Ambassador because it appeared to be an involvement in a Presidential campaign.

I do not view Ambassador Woodcock's statements in that vein at all. He was saying the same things he and I have said before your committee and in public many times regarding our commitment to United States/People's Republic of China relations within the framework of our announcement.

CHANGE WOULD AFFECT RELATIONSHIP

I do feel that any change of an upgrading of the relationships with the people of Taiwan will affect Sino-American relations. In other words, that is to say I do not believe the People's Republic of China either deliberately interfered in our Presidential campaign nor do I believe that this is merely a bluff by them.

I believe this goes to the heart of one of the two central pillars of the Sino-American relationship.

One is strategic and global. The other is bilateral and relates to Taiwan. They have always said that. They said it to Henry Kissinger in the summer of 1971 on the first secret trip. They said it to Cyrus Vance 3 years ago this week when he went to China and made proposals very similar to those Governor Reagan has made recently.

The People's Republic of China flatly rejected them. They made them in the last 10 days. They are making them with increasing assertiveness recently because they feel that the decision point has arrived.

So I would not downgrade the significance in foreign policy terms, Mr. Chairman, leaving aside the political campaign which is not the subject of our discussion today.

In that sense I share the general concerns which you have stated in your statements over the last few days.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Pritchard.

FOLLOWING AGREEMENTS

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that all parties have now stated that they would scrupulously follow the agreements that we made in our relations with Taiwan and dealing with the People's Republic of China. If we do that, then we are on firm ground, and it is my understanding, as I read the statement, that that is the agreement, that we will scrupulously follow our arrangement that was made, and that is an arrangement between the U.S. Government, the People's Republic of China and no one is going to go back on that arrangement. We are going to scrupulously follow that.

It seems to me that the best thing we can do at this point is for everyone to agree that we are going to do that; everybody has said they are going to agree to it, and if we continue to make statements, I don't think we are going to help our relations with the People's Republic of China.

Now, I can tell you from just an old politician, which I am, that if people think some outside force is monkeying around in our election, it is counterproductive.

I would let the word out to all who can hear that this is not one that has a lot of political mileage in it.

Also, I think it is very harmful for our country at this time. I think the best thing to do is to put this thing to bed and leave it there, and I strongly take that position, and I am going to pursue that strongly in this committee, because I think it is in the Nation's interest.

CHANGES IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNMENT

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Pritchard, may I have your indulgence to make two comments on your very important statement?

First of all, I certainly share your view that foreign governments should not get involved in American political campaigns any more than we should get involved in another country's elections.

It happens, it is rather ironic, but the People's Republic of China is now in the process of their version of a campaign. They are changing their Government.

I am not here as a spokesman for the People's Republic of China, as you well know, but the point I made a moment ago is worth stressing. I believe that the reason the People's Republic of China has taken this position is not because they are siding with one person or another in a campaign, I believe they would have said the same thing in response to statements regarding the Taiwan issue by anybody, but the strength of their statements was related to the nature of what was said by Governor Reagan, the fact of Ambassador Bush's trip—and I think it was difficult for them because George Bush is a real friend of China. They like him. They regard him as a friend. They treated him warmly personally, which made it all the harder for them to do what they did, but they believe and have said publicly and privately in the last 2 weeks that fundamental interests were threatened and they would have done this regardless.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA STILL CONCERNED

I would make one last point. You say the issue is finished—settled. I share that hope, but I am not sure I share the assessment, because if I understand what the People's Republic of China has been saying publicly—and I am not talking about the executive branch's view, I think we made our position very clear—if I understand the People's Republic of China position, they still, despite what has been said, particularly Monday in Los Angeles in that press conference they still are concerned about the absence—and I am now simply reflecting their own public statements in the last 3 days—they remain concerned by the absence of certain types of statements and the inclusion of certain other statements.

Therefore, I do not believe that strictly it is accurate to say that the People's Republic of China perceives an identity of points of view between the executive branch and other people, and I think that is the reason that despite your very well taken caveat, I think that is why they are continuing to say things publicly.

I hope they do here what you have just said too, but I also want to say that we are going to scrupulously adhere to the agreements with the People's Republic of China concerning normalization as well as the law concerning the relationship with Taiwan.

That is two things. Only one of those two things has been mentioned by Governor Reagan. That is why they are objecting.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, I think there will be follow-on statements. There will be a policy that will be enunciated. It is very difficult because, you know, we are in the last few months of a Presidential campaign. Between what people write in the papers, what people say when statements are made, it is a very difficult time, I realize.

I would just lay it out once agian. I believe we are going to follow arrangements that we have made, and I think that it is counterproductive for us to continue to stir this pot.

The more you stir it, the more you create doubts. I think it is a great mistake, and I would hope that we would let the matter rest there.

U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I just hope, Mr. Pritchard, that whatever the outcome of this—that part of the debate that has become politicized in the States, and the final outcome, the strategic interests of the United States in the Pacific are not adversely affected.

I believe we are now on a very thin line here. A tremendous advance in our national interests that began in 1971 and went through three Presidents and culminated in actions in which this committee and yourself were deeply involved, and which I had believed and hoped were almost universally applauded, have been put to the test.

I hope that we do not see adverse consequences to the strategic balance because a chain reaction emanating from the events of the last 2 weeks is not impossible. That is why Ambassador Woodcock said what he said the other day. That is why I have said what I said publicly. Neither of us wants to be involved in the campaign, but we are genuinely concerned that there be no misunderstanding about the commitment of this administration, and that is why I welcomed Chairman Wolff's comments of the other day.

I think they show that the chairman of an important committee that has participated in this shares this view, that there be no turning back from the tremendous increase in American national security that is inherent in the developments in this part of the world in the last 9 years.

Mr. WOLFF. I just want to, however, pose the other side of the coin to you.

The fact that this has become something that is political is quite unfortunate. My colleague did mention the fact that a foreign government's intercession is something that is not welcome in an American election.

I might remind him it wasn't the People's Republic of China that raised the issue. It was raised here by this country.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That is the key point, I think.

TRA OVERSIGHT

Mr. WOLFF. I would like to go a step further, however, so far as you are concerned. That is whether or not there has been—this now is turning into a Taiwan oversight hearing—but I want to take this opportunity, since you are here, in reminding you to fulfill your obligation to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act.

Governor Reagan mentioned the number of consulates, for example, that Taiwan is permitted in this country, which has not been lived up to so far as the act was concerned.

We had long and strenuous debate on that on the floor. We were assured by the State Department there would be no diminution in the number of consulates that were available. I think it is that type of lack of fulfilling the total parameters of the act that caused this type of discussion and rehash of something that we thought was put to bed—something that we thought both sides had not only agreed to, but both sides were living fairly well with.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I think there is a significant difference, although I don't have all the details at my fingertips

right now, between the colloquies that have been had between your subcommittee and us on this issue and what Governor Reagan said.

I really did not want to get into this level of specificity. I don't want to politicize the discussion. I must say since you raise this point that the facts, quote unquote, as cited by Governor Reagan on this issue do not coincide with our view of the facts.

Mr. WOLFF. I am not talking about that.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. His basic numbers——

Mr. WOLFF. Forget what Reagan said. Let's come to the point. The question of the number of consulates that were specifically requested in the original act itself and the legislative history that was created on that. I know because I was one of the people involved as a floor manager of the bill.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. First of all, Mr. Chairman, they are not consulates. We could not refer to them as consulates without breaking every aspect——

Mr. WOLFF. I withdraw the designation. Offices.

Mr. PRITCHARD. See how easy it is to make a slip of the tongue, Mr. Chairman, and get into trouble in this area?

Mr. WOLFF. I am not running for President, [Laughter.]

I want to discuss one thing with you. That is the question of the normalization talks that the State Department has been supposedly having with the Vietnamese.

NO NORMALIZATION TALK WITH VIETNAM

Mr. HOLBROOKE. The facts on this, Mr. Chairman, are as follows: We have not been conducting normalization talks with Vietnam. I think the first sentence of the item in the current issue of Newsweek, the Periscope section, is simply inaccurate. We have had continuing contacts with the Vietnamese in many different places in the world, Bangkok, Paris, New York, elsewhere in the last few years.

The most recent contacts took place in the last 3 weeks in New York City with Vietnamese representatives, and they were part of a continuing dialog which included the MIA issue, bilateral relations, refugees.

Mr. WOLFF. Did you get any response on the MIA issue?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, but we would not talk to the Vietnamese without discussing it, largely because of your concern for the issue and because of the importance of the issue.

These talks did not advance us any nearer normalization. That was not the goal of the talks. We wanted to talk about the Vietnamese attitudes in the wake of the June 19—excuse me, July 19 Foreign Minister's statement issued in Vientiane by the Vietnamese, the Lao, and the Heng Samrin regime.

We wanted to reiterate our own concerns and see whether there had been any movement on the part of the Vietnamese. This is part of our preparations for forthcoming debate in the General Assembly.

POL POT SEATING ISSUE

Mr. WOLFF. Have any decisions been made as to the vote of the United States regarding the seating of the delegation?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, sir. As Secretary Muskie told you, that matter is still under active and intensive review. No final decisions have been made. We are in constant communications with our friends in Asia, who I know are also in constant contact with you and your committee, with the Chinese, Japanese, Australians, New Zealanders, and Europeans on this matter.

F-16 SALES

Mr. WOLFF. One final question: In Mr. Armacost's testimony to us on June 25, he replied to my question on the status of the F-16 sale with an answer that some observers felt might imply the United States was sending a signal that the deal was not locked in.

Can you give us any idea as to what that situation is?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I would stand with Mr. Armacost's statement at this time.

Mr. WOLFF. In other words, no decision has been made on this as yet?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No. We have advanced toward a decision, but we are still defining certain decisions on the timing. My military colleagues on both sides of me and I have been in active discussion on that.

I would hope we can confer privately on that in the next few days to get your judgments before we move forward.

I would request that beyond that we not pursue that issue in this session, this open session any further, but if you are willing, I would like very much to have perhaps Admiral Jones and members of my staff talk to members of your staff about it in the next few days.

Mr. WOLFF. Very good. Thank you.

Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Can you discuss with us the Japanese Government's viewpoint? Did you ask that?

I will get it out of the record. I do think it is terribly important, the role they play in all of this.

I think it is unfair. I want to read your statement and then I will ask questions. I deeply apologize for coming late, but we are at this time in this Congress where we get caught up in conference reports and things where we just can't leave.

I desperately wanted to be here. I must say I am glad I came in when I did.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I understand, Mr. Pritchard.

WITHDRAWING INVITATION TO REAGAN

Mr. WOLFF. Is it the gentleman's desire that we withdraw the invitation to Mr. Reagan?

Mr. PRITCHARD. No. I think when the Republican members sit down with you and have a chance to talk it over, we will decide it really wasn't a very good idea.

The general proposition, as I understand in subcommittees, is that you do consult with the minority before you launch out in any type of an inquiry. I am sure you will stay with that time-honored tradition.

Mr. WOLFF. I have. All I have done in this particular case—as I am sure the gentleman realizes—I just wanted to afford an adequate platform, which is in line with our responsibilities. If the gentleman doesn't agree——

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think it is an unfortunate platform. I think we can talk about it later.

Mr. WOLFF. I don't believe that there are any further questions. Therefore, we thank you very much for appearing before us here today.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX 1

Questions and Answers on Economic, Domestic, Political, and International Developments in South Korea

Question. Does the American Embassy in Korea lack broadly based contacts at all levels of Korean society?

Answer. Ambassador Gleysteen and his colleagues in our Embassy in Seoul have very broad contacts at various levels of Korean society. Mutual dialogue and understanding are very important between the United States and the Republic of Korea. There can never be enough of such contact, but our views are not based on access to only a few currents within the Korean society. Our Embassy in Seoul has worked hard to keep us informed of the views of various groups within the country. By the nature of the situation, however, some persons who seek explicit and public U.S. endorsement of a point of view or a specific U.S. action may allege that their point of view is not heard or understood.

Question. What is the legitimacy of the present government in Seoul, and how temporary is the surrogate government?

Answer. Formal legitimacy has been retained by the authorities in Seoul. President Choi Kyu-hah has continued in his constitutional office, and a civilian cabinet remains. However, a number of extra-legal and extra-constitutional arrangements have been made since mid-May, including preventing the National Assembly from meeting or functioning and the establishment of military-civil "Special Committees for National Security Measures" which increasingly are assuming authority normally reserved to the Cabinet, legislature, and other agencies of the government.

The senior Army officers who wield very great authority over all aspects of Korean government at the present time do so formally through the mechanism of extended martial law.

New constitutional and political arrangements are being developed. Efforts appear to be underway during the next few months to strike accommodations which the authorities hope will bring public support and legitimacy. The nature of those accommodations are for the Korean people to make, and it would be inappropriate for us to prejudge the results. President Choi has promised that a constitutional referendum will be held before the end of October, and that elections will be held in the spring of 1981 for a new government which will take office before the end of June. The conditions under which these developments take place and the degree of real choice available to the Korean people will have an important influence on whether a broadly-based government emerges which demonstrably has achieved legitimacy through the support of the Korean people.

Question. We notice some releases of dissidents in Korea. Are these token releases, or are they expressions of good faith of things to come?

Answer. There have not been enough significant releases since the extension of martial law in mid-May to indicate a major effort at reconciliation or leniency. In the wake of the large student demonstrations in Seoul and the subsequent near-insurrection in the southern city of Kwangju in May, large numbers of persons were detained by martial law authorities for investigation. Reportedly, over 1,000 have subsequently been released without charges, on the basis of screening and further investigative work.

A small number of politicians, including the President of the Democratic Republican Party, former Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil, and several other formerly prominent individuals were released at the beginning of July after having reportedly agreed to turn most of their wealth over to the government and to refrain from any further political activity. These individuals were publicly accused of corruption, although no legal proceedings were ever held, and their removal from the political scene seems to have been extracted in return for their freedom. A very small number of other individuals who were detained, including some National Assemblymen, have also been released.

We have no accurate list of those still under extraordinary detention without charge or trial, but believe the total numbers several hundred. The first formal charges against individuals detained since the extension of martial law on May 17 were published on July 4, when former opposition political figure Kim Dae-jung and 36 political associates were formally accused of a sweeping range of violations. The authorities have indicated that their trials will be conducted before a martial law court.

The emphasis of the authorities at this time is on "purification" of the government, and this suggests to many observers that further firings and/or arrests are to be expected.

Question. How much freedom of the press do we have? You mentioned restraints and some censorship. Are we getting accurate stories from that country?

Answer. Strict censorship and control of the media are in effect under martial law authorities. The authorities have gone to considerable lengths to limit and control access by the Korean people to all sources of information—e.g. outside newspapers, magazines, and broadcasts.

This censorship has not extended to reports by correspondents of American publications in Korea which are sent back to this country. The problem is not the information available to the American public, but the limitations on information available to the Korean public, including severe limitations on accurate reporting of the official views and actions of the U.S. Government. This has understandably led to misunderstandings by many Koreans of the degree of American involvement in or approval of recent events, a situation which we are naturally making every effort to rectify.

Question. We understand that the economy has sagged very, very appreciably and because of the chaos and unrest there has been a decline in productivity, a decline in manufacturing, and a definite fall off in exports. What is the situation?

Answers. After nearly two decades of spectacular economic growth during which real increases in GNP averaged about 9.5 percent annually, Korean economic growth slowed to 7.1 percent in 1979. Part of the slowdown was self-induced as the government early last year adopted a stabilization program to combat growing inflationary pressures. But the downturn was much sharper than expected due to last year's petroleum price increases and the slowdown in the world economy. For the first half of 1980, the GNP has declined about 2 percent, and overall growth for the year will be minimal. Although Korean economic planners expect the inflation rate to begin to ease soon, it continues to run at between 30 to 40 percent despite the economic slowdown and rising unemployment.

While Korea experienced similar economic problems following the oil price increases of 1974, the economy was able to rebound quickly to previous high levels of growth. A recovery this time is likely to come more slowly because of the increased size and sophistication of the Korean economy, rising protectionism in major markets, and increased competition from other exporting nations.

These economic ills have undoubtedly been exacerbated somewhat by recent political problems. Export growth was negative in real terms last year and is well below its recent historical trend this year. Investments have fallen off sharply, and both sectors are subject to the psychological effects of political disturbances. High-level personnel changes and civil disorders have probably caused decreased efficiency in both government and private sectors. Latest indicators point to continuing problems in the economy, although there are definite signs that inflationary pressures are abating. It will probably take some time before the economy regains its previous momentum; to a large extent this will depend on the international energy situation and the maintenance of a open trading system as well as stabilization of the domestic political process. Barring widespread civil disorder, the long-term economic prospects remain good.

Question. How is the diplomatic status? How stable are things if our Committee decides to call upon the South Korean government in the near future? Is there a state of cordiality? Of relative safety?

Answer. I know of no reason to believe that a visit by the Committee to Korea would not be received with cordiality under conditions in which the members need not be concerned about their safety. However, since governmental arrangements there are in transition, not all of the officials of the government currently have the degree of authority which is normally inherent in their offices. Conversely, certain individuals exercising major authority do not at this time occupy positions which would make it entirely appropriate perhaps for the Committee to call upon them.

Question. What is the diplomatic status of the Government of the Republic of Korea with other countries beside us?

Answer. Recent events, with one possible exception, have not affected the formal diplomatic relations of the Republic of Korea with any country. 112 countries have diplomatic relations with Seoul. Since the extension of martial law in mid-May, only one country—the Seychelles—has withdrawn its recognition of the Republic of Korea.

Question. Have the units which were withdrawn by the Koreans from the ROK-US Combined Forces Command following the assassination of President Park in late October been restored to the Combined Command?

Answer. Following President Park's assassination, General Wickham was informed on a contingency basis that, if the situation warranted, the Korean Government might need on short notice to seek release of certain designated units from their Combined Command responsibilities. In fact, these units were never at that time withdrawn from the Combined Command and the contingency did not materialize.

In mid-May 1980, some of these same units which had been discussed on a contingency basis in late October 1979 were formally requested for release from their Combined Command responsibilities. This was granted. As of June 25, approximately two-thirds of the units involved were already returned to Combined Command responsibilities and control. The principal units which have thus far not been returned to the Combined Command are two battalions of the First Marine Division normally stationed at the Southeastern seaport of Pohang, and elements of the 20th Infantry Division. The Marine elements are part of the reserve forces of the Combined Command, and the 20th Division serves as a reserve of a forward army.

Question. What are the whereabouts and physical condition of the various people who have been incarcerated? Can their families visit them? Specifically, what about Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil and the like?

Answer. We have no information on the majority of those detained by the Korean martial law authorities since mid-May. Mr. Kim Jong-pil, Mr. Lee Hu-rak, and several others were released from custody at the beginning of July. We have been repeatedly assured by the most authoritative levels of the Korean Government that Mr. Kim Dae-jung and a number of other prominent individuals are well and are being treated with courtesy. They are evidently being held in a number of separate locations in Seoul. We have been assured that families and lawyers would be provided access to the prisoners shortly after initial investigations were completed and formal charges filed. Such charges were filed against Mr. Kim Dae-jung and 36 others on July 4. We do not yet have any independent evidence of the welfare of any of these or other prisoners still in detention under extended martial law. We continue strongly to urge Korean authorities to permit immediate access at least by family members and legal counsel.

Question. What is our present troop strength in Korea?

Answer. Authorized strength of U.S. Forces in Korea as of the beginning of July is 37,474 personnel. Of this total, 29,065 are Army, and 8,150 are Air Force. The remaining 259 are Navy and Marine Corps personnel.

Question. Do we have any indication of the amount and type of military equipment that has been brought into Vietnam from the Soviet Union?

Answer. Since the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam, the USSR has supplied considerably-increased amounts (as compared to 1978 and prior years) of military hardware to Vietnam. 1979 arms shipments were about four times greater than 1978. If the present level is maintained total arms shipments in 1980 will be somewhat lower than in 1979. These supplies consist mainly of weapons types already in use in Vietnam, but have also included small quantities of first-time current export-model weapons of types not possessed by China.

APPENDIX 2

Statement of J. Bryan Hehir, United States Catholic Conference

U.S. Policy in Korea: Security and Human Rights

This testimony, submitted on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) is based upon the relationship we have had with the Catholic church in Korea. The relationship is predicated, in part, on the substantial impact which U.S. policy has on events in Korea as these affect human dignity, human rights, democratic freedoms and the problem of security. These questions, political in content, are also moral issues precisely because they touch the dignity of the human person and the way in which society is structured. Hence, they engage the church's social ministry of justice and peace in Korea, and because of U.S. involvement with Korea, they are of concern to the church in this country. We are very appreciative, therefore, for the opportunity to submit testimony to this subcommittee which has such a direct and powerful role in shaping U.S. policy toward Korea.

The testimony is based on the continuing analysis we make of U.S.-Korean relations, but more specifically it is the result of a joint USCC-National Council of Churches (NCC) visit to the church in Korea which Ms. Peggy Billings (NCC) and I just made in mid-August. The purpose of this testimony is to draw upon information gained in that visit and to place it in a broader policy perspective. The essential policy question, in our view, is the relationship of human rights and security in Korea; in the context of this question the testimony will also comment on the Kim Dae Jung trial.

I. Human Rights and Security

Human rights were a persistent problem for U.S. policy in Korea throughout the regime of President Park. The assassination of Park and the steps taken immediately after it raised hopes that the era of dictatorial rule was over and the first steps toward the restoration of democracy could begin. These hopes were jolted by the coup on December 12, 1979, and they were demolished in the restoration of martial law throughout the country in May 1980.

Korea today is on the way back to the atmosphere of the Park era with a vengeance. Indeed most of those we consulted during our visit (Koreans and foreigners) expect the regime of Chon Doo Hwan to be more repressive and more systematically dictatorial than the Park regime. The actions of the government and the atmosphere created by them provide evidence that some of the worst fears of these observers are being realized.

The possibility of truly free and representative elections is a very distant hope. The press is a controlled instrument of propaganda for the government. Our visit coincided with the opening of the trial of Kim Dae Jung and his codefendants as well as with the resignation of President Choi Kyu Ha. The press coverage was designed both to destroy Kim Dae Jung as a public figure and to pave the way for Chon Doo Hwan's take over of the reins of power in Korea. The political opposition has been effectively decimated. The "purification program", an aggressive government campaign against corruption and inefficiency is undoubtedly appreciated as a needed reform by many Koreans. At the same time it is also being used to intimidate labor leaders or others in the work force who could pose any organized resistance to the government. The combination of a controlled press, the lack of political opposition and the universities being reopened under tight government supervision all produce a situation where freedom of speech is impossible.

This series of actions by the government has created an atmosphere of fear and suspicion which pervades Korean society. For some years now one of the church leaders we visited, Cardinal Kim, the Archbishop of Seoul, has said that this is the fundamental consequence of dictatorial rule: a society in which fear is so pervasive that trust among the population is eroded. People fear the government, its agency the Korean CIA, which seems to be everywhere present, and then they come to fear and distrust each other. This of course is the familiar dynamic of Communist societies, which is precisely what makes the atmosphere so devastating in a society defined by its opposition to and difference from a Communist society.

This attack on human rights and democratic freedoms by the government is justified principally by an appeal to "security". As used by the Korean government, security means military security, i.e., protection of the South from attack or subversion by the North. Now it is clear that people of almost all political persuasion in the South agree that military security is necessary. This was manifest at the time of the announcement of the U.S. troop withdrawal. Those in Korea who were vigorously opposed to the Park regime on human rights grounds and who wanted increased pressure on Park did not want the troops withdrawn.

The debate in Korea is not whether security is necessary: it is whether military security is sufficient. Cardinal Kim has stated forcefully what others believe firmly: the government's narrow definition of security (as military) is eroding the real security of the nation.

By failing to develop a concept of security which includes the protection of human rights and the promotion of democratic freedom as essential to security, the government is endangering the future of the country. This is because it creates a kind of opposition among key sectors of the populace which threatens the cohesion of the society. The Cardinal has said often that the present policy destroys the people's will to resist outside forces.

Of particular concern to this testimony is the fact that U.S. policy in its present form reenforces this narrow view of security rather than providing an alternative vision. The Carter policy has proven to be severely disappointing to the Koreans we saw. At the outset of this Administration there was a conscious balance struck between human rights and security considerations in Korea. This was a welcome change from the Kissingerian style of ignoring human rights problems whenever the security question came into play. The Carter policy, therefore, aroused the hopes of the Korean people.

Critics of the Carter policy, here and there, often found the tactics unsatisfactory - the penchant for private diplomatic pressure rather than any public gesture indicating U.S. attempts to intensify the human rights issue in Korea. At times though even public moves were made, the clearest being the significant omission of Korea from Vice President Mondale's first foreign trip in 1977.

Today the debate about the Administration's policy is not about tactics but about substance. The tension of the early years between human rights and security has been lost. Perhaps the cause of the shift is increased superpower tension; perhaps it is short-term election year tactics. Whatever the cause, the result is that U.S. policy, implicitly and explicitly, reenforces the direction of Chon Doo Hwan: security equals military security and human rights along with democratic institutions are dispensable items at this time.

No clearer example can be found of the Administration's acquiesence to this line of thinking than its handling of Gen. Wickham's statement of support for Chon Doo Hwan just before our trip to Korea. The statement was taken in Korea as an expression of U.S. policy. At the U.S. embassy I was assured that a spokesman had negated it. In Korea people seemed neither to have heard nor believed the spokesman. The problem was that the Wickham case can be compared to the Singlaub case. The strong feeling was that if General Wickham was sent back, as he now has been, this would illustrate the logic of U.S. policy far more clearly than any statement.

In a sense the present direction of U.S. policy can be grasped by comparing two different issues: the Kim Dae Jung case and the Wickham statement. After modest beginnings, the Administration publicly and privately has intensified its intervention in the case of Kim Dae Jung. Hardly anyone doubts that the U.S. is actively

pressing the Korean regime to guarantee that Kim will not be executed. While U.S. efforts to pressure for an "open trial" have hardly been successful, the attention given to Kim Dae Jung's fate is appreciated and regarded as very necessary given the regime's desire to rid the country of Kim's witness.

While we concentrate on this case, however, the appearance and the reality seems to be that the main lines of Chon Doo Hwan's policy go uncontested. The Wickham statement has made us prisoners of the policy even though we still contest cases. In this situation our human rights concerns are reduced to specific instances while we fail to deal with the framework which produces the cases.

When pressed on this distinction the Administration usually pleads lack of leverage. The declining amounts of U.S. economic aid are cited as proof of decreasing influence. There is a further concern not to be interventionary which I grant is a healthy concern in principle for U.S. policy. The problem in the Korea case is that pleading nonintervention as a reason for inaction on human rights conveys the idea that the U.S. is an outside observer to the Korean scene. The presence of 37,000 troops, armed with nuclear weapons, and the history of the last 25 years makes the U.S. an actor on the scene: the question is how we use our presence. The plea of lack of leverage rings hollow with Koreans who have lived so close to U.S. presence for so long.

The result of the present policy is a perceptible, indeed palpable, increase of anti-American feeling in Korea. Even a brief visit brings home the fact. It was described for us by church officials, by the families of those on trial and by individuals (Koreans and foreigners) whom we met during our visit. The quality

of this feeling is different than the kind of anti-American attitude one finds in other nations. For the Koreans it seems to be a case of disappointed expectations, a sense of being let down by American policy on precisely those grounds (human rights and democracy) which they understood to be the distinctive quality of our country. It translates into a sense that we are uninterested in standing abroad for what we treasure at home. One leading church figure summarized it as: you have defended your capitalism abroad but not your democracy.

II. The Trial of Kim Dae Jung

Our visit to Korea coincided by design with the trial of Kim Dae Jung. The USCC and the NCC had supported the idea of an observer from the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) at the Kim trial. When the government turned ICJ down, it became even more necessary, we believed, to have someone present from the U.S. churches when the trial began. We were, of course, not at the trial.

The trial is described as "open" by the Korean government. The claim should be challenged, indeed it should be denied. Nothing we found in the circumstances surrounding the trial gives the adjective open any credibility. Our delegation met with some of the families of the defendants in the trial. As they said in a statement published at the outset of the trial they were totally unsatisfied with the pre-trial preparations. They had tried to hire defense lawyers and found that some had been intimidated while others simply would not take the case. Just days before the trial lawyers suddenly appeared as defense counsel whom they did not know, and under the circumstances, could hardly trust.

Admission to the courtroom was by ticket. The press was limited to two foreign correspondents allowed in on a rotating basis along with some members of the Korean press. The foreign reporters prepared a pool story which was censored by the government before it could be used. Five diplomatic observers were allowed into the courtroom.

On the whole the impression one takes away is not only that the trial is not open but the verdict concerning Kim Dae Jung is all but assured. The government controlled press is certainly setting the stage for a guilty verdict. My view is the conviction is assured and that only the sentence is open for negotiation. The U.S. efforts to prevent execution should be maintained and intensified. There is good cause to be concerned.

III. The Kwangju Incident.

The other major theme of our visit was the Kwangju incident, the way in which the Korean government suppressed the student-led demonstration in Kwangju during the last two weeks of May. Many descriptions of the event have been published. It is not my purpose to review the details again. I did visit Kwangju and talked with Archbishop Youn and his associates. Three points are worth stressing in this testimony. First, the Archbishop is convinced that the government troops provoked violence from the people. Second, as yet no satisfactory investigation of the incident has taken place; the Archbishop suggested to the government that an international body be invited in to make a report. Third, Kwangju has left a population filled with resentment at their own government.

Our visit covered other themes such as the government's handling of the Kwangju incident and the continuing role of the churches in human rights questions. Rather than detail those issues here I conclude with a special plea to this subcommittee to intensify and expand its range of activities regarding U.S.-Korea relations. It is a crucial time and there is a great danger that the pressure of election year politics will override the necessary business of carefully shaping a complex policy. A return to the earlier Administration policy of balancing security concerns with an equally strong policy dimension of human rights is what is needed. I urge the subcommittee to do all it can to assist this change in policy.

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